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DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES, DRIVING PERFORMANCE, AND ACUTE 
RESPONSES TO ALCOHOL IN DUI OFFENDERS 
 
Alcohol-impaired driving is a major cause of motor vehicle accident and death in the 
United States.  People who are arrested for DUI (Driving under the Influence) are at high 
risk to reoffend; approximately one in three of these individuals will commit another DUI 
offense in the three years following their first conviction (Nochajski & Stasiewicz, 2006).  
This high risk for recidivism in these individuals suggests that cognitive characteristics 
may contribute to a pattern of pathological decision making leading to impaired driving.  
Indeed, individuals with a history of DUI report higher rates of impulsiveness and 
behavioral dysregulation compared to their nonoffending peers.  Relatively little research, 
however, has used laboratory methods to identify the specific behavioral characteristics, 
such as poor inhibitory control or heightened sensitivity to immediate reward, which may 
differentiate DUI offenders from nonoffenders.  Further, little is known about how 
individuals with a history of DUI respond following an acute dose of alcohol.  Study 1 
examined impulsivity in 20 adults with a recent DUI conviction and 20 adults with no 
history of DUI using self-report and behavioral measures of impulsivity.  This study also 
used a novel decision-making paradigm to examine how different levels of risk and 
reward influenced the decision to drive after drinking in both groups.  Results of this 
study found that DUI offenders did not differ from controls in their performance on 
behavioral measures of impulsivity. They did, however, report higher levels of 
impulsivity and demonstrated a greater willingness to tolerate higher levels of risk for 
more modest rewards.  Study 2 examined the acute effects of alcohol and expectancy 
manipulation on driving performance and decision making in the same group of 
participants.  Neither alcohol nor expectancy manipulation exerted a systematic effect on 
decision making in either group.  Alcohol impaired driving performance equally in both 
groups, but the DUI group perceived themselves as less impaired by alcohol. Expectancy 
manipulation eliminated this group difference in perceived driving ability.  Taken 
together, these findings identify processes that risk of impaired driving in DUI offenders.  
They may perceive themselves as less impaired by alcohol, leading to risky decision 
making when drinking.  Expectancy manipulation may be a viable method of reducing 
risky decision making in DUI offenders.  
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Chapter 1: General Introduction 
  Driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) is a significant and persistent 
societal problem. In 2014, alcohol-intoxicated drivers contributed to approximately 
10,000 motor vehicle fatalities, accounting for approximately one third of all deaths that 
took place on United States roadways during that year (NHTSA, 2015). Also concerning 
is the financial burden of DUI in the United States.  The National Highway Traffic Safety 
Association (2015) estimated that in 2014 the annual cost of medical services, lost 
productivity, quality-of-life services, public services used to address enforcement, and 
destruction of personal property resulting from DUI was $44 billion in the United States. 
Considering the tragic loss of life and economic damage caused by intoxicated drivers, it 
is not surprising that public opinion towards driving after drinking is largely negative.  
The majority of people in the United States (80%) believe that intoxicated driving is a 
threat to their personal safety (NHTSA, 2008). The significant societal cost of DUI and 
public support for deterrence measures have led lawmakers to adopt strict legal sanctions 
to reduce the rate of intoxicated driving in the general population (Cavaiola & Wuth, 
2002).  
 Despite negative public attitudes towards DUI offenders and deterrence programs 
aimed at reducing rates of intoxicated driving, the practice is relatively commonplace 
among drivers in the United States. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(2012) estimated that approximately 120 million instances of impaired driving occurred 
in 2011, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (2015) estimated that approximately 1.2 
million DUI arrests were made in 2014.  Unfortunately, people who are convicted of DUI 
are at high risk to reoffend: over one third of the drivers arrested for DUI will reoffend 
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within three years (Nochajski & Stasiewicz, 2006).  Researchers and clinicians have 
attempted to develop intervention programs to reduce recidivism in DUI offenders. 
Although early data have shown that these programs can reduce recidivism rates (Bakker, 
Hudson, & Ward, 2000), a significant proportion of DUI offenders referred to treatment 
programs will continue to drive while intoxicated. The treatment-resistant nature of DUI 
offenders has led researchers to examine neuropsychological and personality processes 
that may contribute to their decision to drive after drinking. Identifying traits of DUI 
offenders associated with recidivism may explain why some individuals repeatedly 
decide to drive while intoxicated, and this information may lead to more targeted 
intervention strategies.  
Characteristics of the DUI Offender 
 Historically, alcohol-intoxicated driving was understood as being a direct result of 
alcohol dependence (Cavaiola & Wuth, 2002). Although it is true that DUI offenders are 
more likely to meet criteria for alcohol dependence (Cavaiola, Strohmetz, Wolf, & 
Lavender, 2003), many people who are arrested for DUI will not meet criteria (Lapham, 
de Baca, McMillan, & Hunt, 2004).  A conceptual shift in recent years has led 
researchers to view DUI as a problem with different causes and maintaining factors than 
alcohol dependence. One possibility is that DUI offenders are characterized by patterns 
of dysregulated behavior, such that intoxicated driving is but one manifestation of their 
underlying impulsive personalities.   
 Along these lines, there is a sizeable literature examining personality traits in DUI 
offenders using self-report methods. These studies have used narrow (e.g., Zuckerman 
Sensation-Seeking Scale) and broadband (e.g., NEO-PI-R) measures of personality to 
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identify how DUI offenders differ from their nonoffending peers. Donovan and Marlatt 
(1982) administered a battery of self-report inventories to a group of DUI offenders, 
finding elevated levels of hostility, aggression, sensation-seeking, and assaultiveness in 
this group.  Donovan et al. (1983) concluded in a later review that DUI offenders are 
characterized by heightened impulsivity, irritability, low frustration tolerance, poor 
assertiveness, external locus of control, and emotional instability.  Results of subsequent 
studies have supported the general conclusions of earlier work: DUI offenders are 
characterized by maladaptive personality traits that are associated with behavioral 
undercontrol and impulsivity (Donovan, Umlauf, & Salzberg, 1990; Hubicka, Kallmen, 
Hiltunen, & Bergman, 2010; Nolan, Johnson, & Pincus, 1994; Sutker, Brantley, & Allain, 
1980).  
 In addition to personality-based assessment of DUI offenders, several studies 
have examined their performance on neuropsychological tasks.  Glass et al. (2000) 
administered a battery of neuropsychological tests to a group of recidivist DUI offenders. 
The test battery included measures of immediate and delayed memory recall, word 
fluency, processing speed, and planning.  Results of this study showed that 73% of the 
DUI offenders had clinically significant impairment in at least one cognitive domain, 
suggesting that cognitive impairment is common among recidivist DUI offenders. A 
similar study conducted by Fine and Steer (1979) found that 57% of DUI offenders 
produced test scores indicative of memory problems. Other studies have reported similar 
patterns of diffuse cognitive impairment in DUI offenders (Kasar, Gleichgerrcht, 
Keskinkilic, Tabo, & Manes, 2010; Ouimet et al., 2007), supporting the notion that 
dysfunctional cognitive processes may contribute to DUI risk.  
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 Findings from the above studies suggest that DUI offenders are characteristically 
impulsive and show neurocognitive deficits; however, there is little research focused on 
identifying specific cognitive and personality mechanisms of increased risk for alcohol- 
impaired driving in these individuals.  An important next step in this line of research is to 
apply theoretically based models of impulsivity to understand how such characteristics 
place DUI offenders at risk to offend.   
Experiments in this Dissertation 
 This dissertation reports on a pair of experiments aimed at expanding our 
understanding of the characteristics of DUI offenders.  It is clear from the literature that 
DUI offenders are more impulsive and show neurocognitive deficits compared to the 
general population; however, lacking from prior research is theory-based assessment of 
impulsive personality and model-based assessment of neurocognitive processes 
associated with impulsive action.  Further, few studies have attempted to characterize 
how person by situation interactions influence the decision to drive after drinking. The 
first experiment in this dissertation attempted to characterize DUI offenders using a 
battery of behavioral tasks and personality-based assessments of impulsivity.  This 
project also assessed how situational variables affect the decision to drive after drinking 
using a newly developed Risk versus Reward Driver Decision (RRDD) task.  Finally, this 
experiment examined impulsivity and driving ability among DUI offenders in the context 
of a simulated driving task.   
 The second experiment in this dissertation built upon the first by examining the 
acute effects of alcohol on driving performance and decision making among DUI 
offenders.  Because of their impulsivity, DUI offenders may not accurately perceive the 
5 
 
degree to which alcohol impairs their driving ability.  Modifying their expectation of 
impairment may be an effective way to reduce the risk of intoxicated driving in this 
group. This brief feedback intervention may make them less willing to drive after 
drinking as well as reduce the degree to which alcohol impairs their driving ability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Walter Roberts 2016 
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Chapter 2: Impulsivity and Decision-Making Processes in DUI Offenders 
(Experiment 1) 
Introduction 
 DUI offenders are known to show heightened levels of impulsivity (Donovan, 
Umlauf, & Salzberg, 1990; Hubicka, Kallmen, Hiltunen, & Bergman, 2010; Nolan, 
Johnson, & Pincus, 1994; Sutker, Brantley, & Allain, 1980; Van Dyke & Fillmore, 
2014); however, little research has been conducted to clarify the specific personality and 
behavioral processes contributing to their impulsive actions. Further, little work has been 
done to examine how external factors, such as varying potential risk and reward 
outcomes, can influence decision making among individuals at risk for DUI.  Experiment 
1 sought to characterize DUI offenders using well-validated laboratory and self-report 
measures of impulsivity.  Another goal was to develop a novel task that measured the 
influence of situational risk and reward factors on the decision to drive after drinking.  
This study also examined driving performance in DUI offenders.   
Personality-Based Models of Impulsivity 
 In the personality literature, impulsivity refers to several different personality 
processes that lead to rash or unplanned acts (Dick et al., 2010).  A shift towards a 
heterogeneous view of impulsivity has occurred in recent years.  Much of this shift is 
based upon foundational work on the UPPS model of impulsivity conducted by 
Whiteside and Lynam (2001).  Recognizing that different personality traits can 
predispose individuals to act impulsively, these researchers conducted a factor analysis of 
existing impulsivity and personality questionnaires and identified four distinct traits 
associated with a tendency towards impulsive action.  These traits included urgency (i.e., 
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tendency to experience strong impulses under negative affect), (lack of) premeditation 
(i.e., tendency to act on the spur of the moment without regard to the consequences), 
(lack of) perseverance (i.e., difficulty with focusing on a task that may be boring or 
difficult), and sensation seeking (i.e., tendency to enjoy activities that are exciting or 
novel).  Measurement of impulsivity using this model is useful because it recognizes that 
the same impulsive behavior can result from different personality processes. For 
example, a person may impulsively drive after drinking because they enjoy the sensation 
of doing so (i.e., sensation seeking) or because he or she does not consider the negative 
consequences associated with this behavior (i.e., [lack of] premeditation).   
Behavioral Models of Impulsivity 
Another approach to understanding impulsivity is to use laboratory tasks that 
assess the integrity of behavioral and cognitive processes used to stymie impulsive 
actions (Dick et al., 2010; Dougherty, Mathias, Marsh, & Jagar, 2005). Such tasks have 
been instrumental in showing how dysfunction in a specific cognitive mechanism can 
lead an individual to behave in an impulsive fashion.  For example, researchers have used 
behavioral measures of response inhibition (e.g., stop-signal task; Logan, Cowan, & 
Davis, 1984) to identify dysfunctional inhibitory control as a contributing factor in the 
symptomatology of individuals with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD; 
Roberts, Fillmore, & Milich, 2011). 
 As previously discussed, several studies have examined DUI offenders in terms of 
their performance on neuropsychological tasks (Kasar et al., 2010; Ouimet et al., 2007), 
generally finding that DUI offenders show impairment on these tasks.  Those studies 
have been instrumental in showing that DUI offenders differ from the general population 
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in terms of general neurocognitive functioning; however, these studies lack of cohesive 
theoretical framework that explains how these traits contribute to DUI risk.  For 
experiment 1, I identified a series of behavioral tasks measuring cognitive processes 
hypothesized to be of direct relevance to an individual deciding whether to drive after 
drinking.   
Immediate reward salience. The decision to engage in risky behaviors may 
result from a heightened sensitivity to immediate gain (Nigg, 2000).  Humans are 
generally able to inhibit reward-seeking behavior if such behavior is inconsistent with 
internally represented goals. This ability is highly relevant to the DUI offender. For 
example, an intoxicated individual may wish to drive because doing so would result in 
the reward of convenience for the drinker.  Presumably, most drinkers will forgo this 
opportunity for reward because intoxicated driving is incompatible with their internal 
goal of avoiding arrest and personal injury.  For the highly reward-sensitive individual, 
however, the prospect of reward may lead to disadvantageous decision making regardless 
of compatibility with internal goals (Bechara, 2005).  
 Working memory. Impairments of working memory can lead to impulsive 
behavior. Human decision making is guided in part by memory of previous events and 
perceptions of current contingencies (Weber & Johnson, 2009), and this information is 
combined and evaluated in working memory.  Individuals with poor working memory 
capacity may become overloaded as they weigh relevant information, encouraging quick 
decision making based on incomplete evaluation of the pertinent circumstances. 
Supporting this notion, Hinson et al. (2003) showed that experimentally increasing 
working memory load caused participants to respond more impulsively on a decision-
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making task. Other studies have found that people with low working memory capacity 
respond more impulsively than do those with high working memory capacity (Finn, 
Justus, Mazas, & Steinmetz, 1999; Finn, Mazas, Justus, & Steinmetz, 2002). For the DUI 
offender, impaired working memory may limit their ability to evaluate simultaneously the 
risk factors associated with driving after drinking. When working memory capacity is 
limited, heuristic attentional processes select the most salient information in the 
environment (e.g., prospect of immediate reward) at the expense of less salient 
contingencies (e.g., possibility of arrest; Weber & Johnson, 2009).  
 Time estimation. Impulsive individuals show distortions in time estimation that 
cause them to overestimate the speed of the passage of time (Gerbing, Ahadi, & Patton, 
1987). For example, an individual with poor time estimation ability may perceive that 4 
hours have elapsed when only 3 hours have actually passed (Glicksohn, Leshem, & 
Aharoni, 2006). This temporal underestimation in impulsive individuals may result from 
increased arousal or a faster “internal clock” (Wittmann & Paulus, 2008), leading to 
impulsive action via an accelerated internal tempo.   
 Inhibition to alcohol cues. The inability to inhibit prepotent actions is a central 
trait of individuals with dysfunctional impulse control.  Prior research has shown that 
substance-related cues can increase behavioral disinhibition among impulsive 
individuals, such as heavy drinkers (Weafer & Fillmore, 2015) and cocaine users (Pike, 
Stoops, Fillmore, & Rush, 2013).  These studies show that when presented with cues for 
their preferred substances, these individuals become less able to inhibit inappropriate 
action.  Some DUI offenders show heightened attention towards and cognitive 
preoccupation alcohol-related cues in the environment (Miller & Fillmore, 2014).  As 
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such, it is possible that DUI offenders will have greater difficulty inhibiting inappropriate 
responses in the presence of alcohol-related cues.  
Sober-State Driving Performance in DUI Offenders 
Although DUI offenders are riskier drivers overall by virtue of their willingness to 
drive after drinking, some studies have shown that these individuals are poorer drivers 
than their nonoffending peers even when they are sober.  McMillen and colleagues 
(1992) reported that multiple DUI offenders were involved in more traffic accidents and 
received more moving violations compared to first time offenders. A similar study 
reported that repeat DUI offenders were more likely to be involved in traffic accidents 
and have a conviction for reckless and careless driving (Cavaiola, Strohmetz, & Abreo, 
2007).   
These studies use examinations of driving records to quantify driving skill in DUI 
offenders.  Although this technique provides the advantage of external validity, it is 
difficult to isolate the specific driving circumstances in which DUI offenders are 
expected to drive poorly.  Another strategy for measuring driving competence is to use 
simulated driving tasks.  An advantage to using a driving simulator in this context is that 
it provides better control over the driving situations that participants must navigate.  
Considering the range of competencies involved in driving (Groeger, 2000), it is 
important to employ several styles of drive to ensure that performance can be evaluated 
across a range of driving situations.  In some driving scenarios, such as navigating a long 
and uneventful commute (i.e., precision driving), drivers are required to be attentive to 
operating the vehicle and make minor course corrections to remain in their lane. This 
type of driving scenarios places demands on the sustained attention and fine motor skills 
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of the driver.  In contrast, other driving scenarios are challenging due to the motivational 
conflict inherent to the situation.  For example, to a driver who is running late for an 
appointment, the incentives of speeding (i.e., avoiding punishment for being late) may 
outweigh the disincentives of being involved in an accident or receiving a traffic citation.  
Motivational conflict requires drivers to balance the potential risks and rewards 
associated with driving quickly.  Impulsive drivers, such as DUI offenders, may tend to 
drive unsafely in order to pursue the incentive.  
Situational Influence on the Decision to Drive after Drinking  
Most attempts to understand the decision to drive after drinking focus on 
characteristics that exist within the DUI offender (e.g., impulsivity).  However, the 
decision to drive after drinking, like most other behaviors, is influenced by characteristics 
of a person as well as situational variables (Mischel & Shoda, 1995).  When deciding 
whether or not to drive after drinking, potential offenders likely consider situational 
variables (e.g., number of drinks consumed, time since last drink, distance to next 
destination) to determine whether or not they are willing to risk driving (Gustin & 
Simons, 2008; Lewis, Merz, Hays, & Nicholas, 1995).  Previous studies using vignette 
methods have identified situational factors that influence people’s willingness to drive 
after drinking (Thurman, 1986; Turrisi & Jaccard, 1991).  These studies are valuable 
because they provide insight into the situational cues that can influence this decision.  
Thurman (1986) found that participants’ willingness to drive after drinking was inversely 
related to perceived risk in that situation.  For example, participants were more willing to 
drive after drinking if the drinking location was in a rural setting relative to a bar on a 
busy downtown street.  
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Although these studies have provided valuable insight into the effects of 
situational factors on the decision to drive after drinking, there are significant limitations 
to using traditional vignette-based methods. In these vignette-based studies, participants 
are asked to read a scenario and rate their willingness to drive on a Likert scale. The 
scenario is standardized aside from manipulations that changes the perceived amount of 
risk associated with choosing to drive. An example of a vignette used by Thurman (1986) 
is as follows: 
It is 10:00 P.M. on a Friday and you are at a downtown bar. You decide to leave 
and 3 friends ask to go with you. Your destination is 45 miles away over roads 
you have seldom driven and the weather is snowy. You notice that you have 
trouble standing without help and are reminded that you could take the bus 
instead of driving. Considering that the police set up 27 roadblocks in the county 
last month and use Breathalyzer tests to detect drinking drivers, reporting the 
names of those arrested in the local newspaper, what are the chances that you 
would drive? (p. 449) 
This type of vignette does an excellent job of illustrating how levels of risk 
influence the decision to drink and drive.  In the above vignette, the researchers 
manipulated certain factors (e.g., 1 mile rather than 45 miles) to assess how these changes 
in perceived risk influenced the likelihood of participants choosing to drive, finding that 
this decision was most strongly influenced by factors such as the participants’ 
hypothetical level of intoxication, police presence, and distance to be travelled.  
However, factors other than risk level likely contribute to decision making.  People 
decide to drive after drinking because this behavior leads to desirable outcomes (e.g., 
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convenience of driving to the next destination).  It is possible that DUI offenders 
accurately perceive the levels of risk associated with driving after drinking but are more 
willing to discount this risk when given the opportunity for reward.  No studies to date 
have examined how situational changes in perceived gain influence the decision to drive 
after drinking.   
 To better understand the influence of situational risk and reward on the decision 
to drive after drinking, I developed a decision-making paradigm that was used to assess 
how participants’ willingness to drive changes as a function of changing risk and 
opportunity for reward.  The Risk versus Reward Driver Decision (RRDD) task is similar 
to the previously described vignette studies; however, in addition to varying levels of 
risk, the scenarios offered participants a reward associated with deciding to drive while 
intoxicated (see Table 1).  Participants were presented with multiple variations of this 
basic scenario and tasked with deciding whether they drive after drinking if they would 
be compensated for various amounts of money for doing so.  As seen in Table 1, this task 
separately measured four different risk factors, including time since drinking, perceived 
probability of arrest, BAC, and distance to be travelled.  These factors were chosen based 
on findings of previous research (i.e., Thurman, 1986) and because these common factors 
are present any time an individual decides whether to drive after drinking.  
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 compared impulsivity and driving ability in DUI offenders and 
similar individuals with no history of DUI using behavioral and self-report measures.  
Specifically, I used a battery of empirically validated behavioral tasks to assess specific 
cognitive processes implicated in impulsive actions, including discounting of delayed 
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rewards, working memory capacity, time estimation, and inhibition to alcohol-related 
cues.  Self-reported impulsivity was measured using a battery of questionnaires.  The 
primary questionnaire assessed impulsivity according to the UPPS model (Whiteside & 
Lynam, 2000).  I also used the Barrett Impulsiveness Questionnaire (BIS; Patton, 
Stanford, & Barratt, 1995) in order to replicate previous research demonstrating 
heightened levels of impulsiveness among DUI offenders (Van Dyke & Fillmore, 2014a).  
I measured symptoms of ADHD—a clinical condition characterized by heightened levels 
of impulsivity-- using the Barkley Adult ADHD Self-Report Scale (Barkley, 2011).   
To examine different aspects of driving performance, participants completed two 
simulated driving tasks.  The first was a precision drive in which participants guided a 
vehicle along a curvy and unpopulated country road.  The second was a motivational 
conflict drive where participants were rewarded for driving quickly but punished if they 
failed to obey traffic laws (i.e., running a red light).   
Another goal of study 1 was to develop a decision to drive task to assess the 
effects of perceived risk and reward on the decision to drive after drinking.  The specifics 
of this task are described above and in Table 1.  The task was used to compare DUI 
offenders and nonoffending controls in terms of their overall willingness to drive after 
drinking, as well as compare group differences in the effects of changing levels of risk.   
 I predicted that DUI offenders would have poorer performance on the behavioral 
measures of impulsiveness and simulated driving tasks, and they would self-report higher 
levels of impulsiveness compared to their nonoffending peers. On the RRDD task, I 
predicted that DUI offenders would be willing to drive for less money overall compared 
to controls, and that both groups would tolerate more risk as level of reward increased.  I 
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also predicted that DUI offenders would require less of an increase in reward to tolerate 
higher levels of risk compared to controls. 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 20 DUI offenders and 20 adult drivers with no prior DUI 
convictions.  Participants in the DUI group were convicted of a DUI offense within the 
past five years.  Screening measures were used to determine medical history and past and 
current drug and alcohol use.  Individuals who reported severe psychiatric diagnoses 
(e.g., bipolar disorder, schizophrenia) were not included in the study. Volunteers were 
recruited via notices placed on community bulletin boards and by university newspaper 
advertisements. The research was approved by the University of Kentucky Medical 
Institutional Review Board.  Participants received $30 for participating in this study.    
Materials and Measures  
 Risk versus Reward Driver Decision Task (RRDD). This task examined the 
role of situational risk and reward factors on participants’ decisions to drive after 
drinking.  Participants viewed a series of vignettes briefly describing a drinking scenario.  
They were then asked whether they would be willing to drive for various amounts of 
money. Each scenario described one situational factor that varies between scenarios in 
terms of risk level. Situational factors that were examined included “distance to be 
travelled”, “blood alcohol concentration”, “time since last drink”, and “probability of 
being arrested.”  Each risk factor was examined with a series of 100 questions presented 
on a PC.  Different levels of risk and reward are described in Table 1.  Each level of 
potential monetary gain was combined with each level of risk for each factor. Trials were 
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randomized and participants were informed that their responses would be deidentified to 
encourage honest responding. The task was completed separately for each scenario and 
each task required approximately 5 minutes to complete.   
The main criterion variable of this task was the least amount of money required to 
drive under each level of risk.  Each situational factor yielded 10 values: the least money 
required to drive under each level of risk.  Additional criterion variables include average 
money required to drive and the risk slope of money required to drive (i.e., risk slope).  
Average money required to drive was calculated as the mean amount of money required 
to drive across all risk levels of a single situational factor.  This variable was calculated to 
provide an overall measure of willingness to drive independent of risk level.  Risk slope 
was calculated by plotting each participant’s data using risk level as the independent 
variable and money required to drive as the dependent variable.  Least squares regression 
lines were fit to these data and the slope of these lines represent how much of an increase 
in money is required for a single unit increase in risk.  
 Money choice task. Temporal discounting was measured using a money choice 
task described in Richards et al (2004). This task required participants to make a series of 
choices between a small reward delivered immediately and a large reward delivered after 
a variable time delay (1, 2, 30, 180, or 365 days).  For example, a participant would be 
asked to decide between receiving $10 today or $5 two days in the future.  For each time 
delay, an indifference point was calculated that represented the point at which the 
participant had no preference between the smaller immediate reward and the larger 
delayed reward.  Each participant produced an indifference point for each monetary 
delay.  Area under the curve (AUC) analyses were used to quantify discounting of 
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delayed reward, as recommended by Myerson and colleagues (2001), and AUC was the 
criterion variable on this task.  Lower AUC values indicate a preference for immediate 
smaller rewards over larger but delayed rewards.   
To reduce reliance on hypothetical rewards, participants were informed that they 
would receive real money according to their response on one trial chosen at random.  If 
they chose an immediate amount, they were told that the money would be given to them 
immediately at the end of the session.  If they chose a delayed amount, they were told 
that the money would be placed in an envelope with their name and address and be sent 
to them after the specified delay.   
 Time estimation and production tasks. Time estimation and production tasks 
were used to measure accuracy of timing perceptions (Barkley, Murphy, & Bush, 2001). 
The time production task assessed participants’ ability to produce various brief intervals 
of time. The experimenter sat in front of the participant with a stop watch and presented 
them with various time intervals, including 2, 4, 8, 16, 24, 32, and 64 seconds. The 
experimenter began each trial by stating an interval and saying “begin.” The participant 
was instructed to produce each time interval by saying “stop” after they believed the 
specified amount of time had passed.  The experimenter recorded elapsed time for each 
trial using a stopwatch.  Participants were instructed not to use verbal counting methods 
to estimate time.  The criterion measure for this task is the length of the estimated time 
interval for each trial.  
 The time estimation task required participants to verbally estimate a time period 
that the experimenter produced using a stopwatch.  The experimenter produced six 
different time intervals (4, 12, 15, 45, 60, and 90 seconds).  The experimenter verbally 
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began and ended each trial and then elicited an estimation of the time interval from the 
participant.  The criterion measure from this task is the estimated time interval for each 
interval.  
 Letter memory task. The letter memory task was used to measure working 
memory functioning (Morris & Jones, 1990).  In this task, participants are presented 
serially with a list of letters.  Participants were instructed that upon presentation of the 
final letter, they would be required to reproduce the final four letters in the list.  The 
number of letters presented in each list was varied randomly across trials (i.e., 5, 7, 9, and 
11 items) to ensure that participants cannot anticipate the critical items.  They were 
instructed to rehearse out loud the last 4 letters by mentally adding the most recent letter 
and dropping the 5th letter back and then saying the new string of 4 letters out loud.  The 
task began with two practice trials and then complete 24 trials for a total of 96 letters 
recalled. The criterion variable of interest was the proportion of letters recalled correctly 
(Miyake et al., 2000).  
 Attentional-bias behavioral activation (ABBA) task.  The ABBA task is a 
modified cued go/no-go task used to measure inhibition to alcohol-related cues.  Trials 
consist of the following series of events:  (a) presentation of a fixation point (+) for 800 
ms; (b) a blank white screen for 500 ms; (c) a cue image (alcohol or neutral), displayed 
for one of five stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs = 100, 200, 300, 400, and 500 ms); (d) 
a go or no-go target, which remained visible until a response occurred or 1,000 ms had 
elapsed; and (e) an intertrial interval of 700 ms. 
 The cues consisted of alcohol-related images (e.g., beer can, six-pack of beer 
bottles) or neutral images (e.g., stapler, paper towel roll). These were 15 cm X 11.5 cm 
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images presented in the center of the computer monitor against a white background. The 
alcohol beverage type was always beer. After an SOA the cue image turned either solid 
green (go target) or solid blue (no-go target). Participants were instructed to press the 
forward slash (/) key on the keyboard as soon as a green (go) target appeared and to 
suppress the response when a blue (no-go) target was presented.  Key presses were made 
with the right index finger.  
 The task consisted of two conditions: alcohol go condition and alcohol no-go 
condition. In the alcohol go condition, alcohol images turned into the go target on 80% of 
trials and turned into the no-go target on only 20% of trials. Therefore, alcohol images 
operated as go cues based on the high probability that they would signal go targets most 
of the time. As such, these images should have sped reaction time (RT) to the go targets, 
but also increased failures to inhibit the response when the no-go target was occasionally 
presented.  By contrast, in the alcohol no-go condition the opposite cue image-target 
pairings were presented. Therefore, in this condition neutral images serve as go cues, 
producing faster RT to go targets, but more inhibitory failures to the occasional 
presentation of no-go targets. By comparing the alcohol go condition and alcohol no-go 
condition, the task measured the degree to which alcohol-related go cues elicit greater 
response activation, but poorer inhibitory control, compared to alcohol no-go cues.  
Participants were evenly split between conditions such that 10 DUI offenders and 10 
control participants completed the alcohol go condition and the remainder of the sample 
completed the alcohol no-go condition.  
 A test consisted of 250 trials, split into 5 blocks of 50 trials each. Each block 
required approximately 2.5 min to complete and blocks were separated by 30 sec breaks, 
 
20 
 
for a total test time of approximately 15 min.  For each trial, the computer recorded 
whether a response occurred and, if so, the RT in milliseconds was measured from the 
onset of the target until the key was pressed. To encourage quick and accurate 
responding, the computer presented feedback to the participant during the intertrial 
interval by displaying the words correct or incorrect along with the RT in milliseconds.  
 Criterion variables on this task included proportion of go cue/no-go targets trials 
in which participants pressed the response key (i.e., p-fails) and mean response time on 
no-go cue/go target trials (i.e., RT).   
 Driving simulation.  A simulated driving task was used to measure driving 
ability (STISIM Drive, Systems Technology Inc., Hawthorne, CA). This apparatus has 
been used in prior studies on alcohol-impaired driving (Harrison & Fillmore, 2005). The 
driving simulator emulated driving a vehicle by providing the participant with the view of 
a roadway from a driver’s perspective. It includes foot-controlled accelerator and brake 
pedals and a circular steering wheel. Participants were required to maintain a constant 
speed and maintain their vehicle position in the middle of the right lane. Criterion 
measures for the driving simulator were standard indicators of driving performance, 
including standard deviation lane position (LPSD), average speed, standard deviation of 
speed (speed SD), number of collisions, and number of times crossing the center line. 
Two drive scenarios were used that place demands on different aspects of driving 
performance. These scenarios are described below:  
 Precision driving scenario. This driving scenario assessed participants’ ability to 
maintain a constant speed and lane position during an 8 kilometer drive on a meandering 
country road.  They were instructed to maintain a constant speed of 55 miles per hour 
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(MPH) while remaining in the center lane of the road.  The drive took place in a rural 
setting with trees and buildings. Other vehicles appeared in the opposite lane, but the 
participant was not required to pass or brake in response to other vehicles.   
 Motivational conflict driving scenario. This drive scenario assessed how 
opportunity for reward loss and gain affects participants’ driving performance.  It 
required participants to drive approximately 6 miles in a busy metropolitan setting. They 
drove through twenty intersections equipped with traffic lights, and they were signaled to 
stop at five of the intersections. Although participants were instructed to observe traffic 
laws, there were no overt penalties for speeding. Other vehicles were presented in the 
opposite lane, but the participant was not required to pass or brake in response to other 
vehicles. Before the drive, the experimenter informed participants that they would receive 
monetary reward for completing the drive in a certain timeframe (e.g., $5 for less than 5 
min, $4 for 5-6 min). Participants were also informed that they would lose money each 
time they fail to stop at a red light, creating motivational conflict between the possibility 
of gaining money for driving quickly and losing money for driving too fast to brake 
effectively at a red light.  In addition to criterion variables listed above, outcome 
variables for this drive included distance in feet from a red light that the participant 
begins to apply the brakes (i.e., breaking distance) and the number of red lights run (i.e., 
traffic tickets).  
 Kaufman Brief Intelligence Scale—2nd Edition (K-BIT; Kaufman & 
Kaufman, 2004). The K-BIT is a standardized brief measure of general intelligence.  It 
provided an estimate of verbal, nonverbal, and full scale intelligence quotient (IQ).  
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UPPS Impulsive Behavior Questionnaire. (UPPS; Whiteside & Lynam, 
2001).  The 45-item UPPS measured four personality traits associated with impulsive 
behavior, including urgency, (lack of) premeditation, (lack of) perseverance, and 
sensation seeking.  Participants indicated to what degree each statement applies to them 
on a 4-point Likert scale and higher scores indicate higher levels of impulsiveness.   
 Barrett Impulsivity Scale (BIS; Patton et al., 1995). This 30-item questionnaire 
measured impulsiveness through items such as “I act on impulse” and “I consider myself 
always careful”.  Participants indicated how frequently each statement applies to them on 
a 4-point Likert scale (never, occasionally, often, almost always).  Possible score totals 
ranged from 30 to 120, with higher scores indicating greater total levels of impulsiveness.   
 Barkley Adult ADHD Self Report Scale (BAARS; Barkley, 2011). The 
BAARS is an 18-item self-report measure of ADHD symptoms according to DSM-5 
criteria often used for diagnostic purposes. Participants marked how often they 
experience problems related to symptoms of inattention and hyperactivity/impulsivity.  
The BAARS quantifies the number of symptoms which the participant experienced 
“often” or “very often.” Within each symptom cluster, possible scores range from 0 to 9, 
with higher scores indicating the presence of more symptoms.   
 Driving History Questionnaire.  Participants provided information about their 
experiences operating a motor vehicle (e.g., miles driven per day, number of citations) 
using a driving history questionnaire. This questionnaire also gathered information about 
past behavior related to driving after drinking alcohol.  
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 Personal Drinking Habits Questionnaire (PDHQ; Vogel-Sprott, 1992).  The 
PDHQ provided a quantity/frequency measure of typical alcohol use and an estimate of 
how long participants have used alcohol in months.   
 Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV—Alcohol Use Module (SCID-IV; 
First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 2002).  Participants completed the SCID-IV 
Alcohol Use Module to measure symptoms of alcohol abuse and alcohol dependence.   
 Timeline Follow-back (TLFB; Sobell & Sobell, 1992). The TLFB procedure 
was used to assess daily patterns of alcohol consumption. This procedure uses structured 
calendar anchored with holidays and other notable dates to assist participants in recording 
their drinking behavior over the past 90 days.  Participants reported several drinking-
related variables for each day, including (1) number of standard drinks consumed, (2) 
amount of time spent drinking, and (3) whether or not the participant felt “drunk”. This 
information, along with gender and body weight, was used to estimate the resultant BAC 
obtained for each drinking using the anthropometric-based BAC estimation formulae that 
assume an average clearance rate of 15 mg/100 ml per hour (Watson, Watson, & Batt, 
1981).  These formulae have been used in previous studies and have been shown to yield 
high correlations with actual BACs obtain under laboratory conditions (Fillmore, 2001). 
This procedure is considered the gold standard for retrospective reconstruction of alcohol 
consumption and other risk behaviors (Shakeshaft, Bowman, & Sanson-Fisher, 1998). 
The TLFB provided four measures of drinking habits: (a) total drinks (total number of 
drinks consumed), (b) drunk days (total number of days that participants reported feeling 
drunk), (c) drinking days (total number of days that alcohol was consumed, and (d) binge 
days (total number of days characterized by days in which the reported alcohol use of a 
 
24 
 
participant was estimated to yield a BAC of 80 mg/100 ml or higher (National Institute 
on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, 2004). 
Procedure 
 Participants completed the measures and tasks included in Study 1 during a single 
laboratory session.  They first provided informed consent and completed questionnaires 
regarding their health status to ensure that they were eligible to participate.  They then 
completed the questionnaires and behavioral tasks. They were provided with breaks as 
needed to avoid fatigue effects.   
Results 
Demographics, Drinking Habits, and Driving History 
Group differences on demographics, drinking habits, and driving history were 
analyzed using independent samples t tests.  Descriptive data on these measures are 
presented in Table 2.  There were no significant group differences in age, t (38) = 1.5, p = 
.151, years of education, t (38) = 0.4, p = .719, or estimated IQ, t (38) = 0.2, p = .855.  
There were no significant differences in drinking habits according to the TLFB or the 
PDHQ, ts < 1.6, ps > .114.  However, participants in the DUI group reported significantly 
more alcohol-related problems on the abuse, t (38) = 8.3, p <.001, and dependence, t (38) 
= 4.0, p <.001, modules of the SCID-IV.  DUI offenders also had higher scores on the 
AUDIT relative to controls, t (38) = 3.9, p <.001.  The gender composition of the DUI 
group (14 male, 6 female) was not significantly different from that of the control group 
(13 male, 7 female), χ2 (1, N = 40) = 0.1, p = .736.   
There were no significant difference between groups in number of months 
driving, t (38) = 1.1, p = .279 or number of miles driven each day t (38) = 0.3, p = .739.  
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Participants in the DUI group reported receiving more moving vehicle citations than did 
the control group, t (38) = 2.4, p = .020. There was no significant difference in the 
reported number of collisions t (38) = 1.6, p = .127.  The majority of participants in the 
DUI group had one past DUI conviction (n = 17), although some participants in this 
group had a history of two DUI convictions (n = 3).  The mean amount of time between 
their most recent DUI and their participation in the study was 19 months (SD = 15.1 
months). 
Covariate Analysis  
No covariates were included in these analyses because the groups did not differ 
on demographic variables that were expected to be related to the outcome measures of 
interest (e.g., age, IQ, gender composition).  
Self-Reported Impulsivity 
Participants’ scores on self-report impulsivity inventories were analyzed using 
independent samples t tests.  Descriptive statistics for these measures are presented in 
Table 3. This table shows that participants in the DUI group reported higher levels of 
impulsiveness compared to those in the control group.  On the UPPS, DUI offenders 
reported significantly higher levels of (lack of) premeditation, t (38) = 2.5, p = .017, and 
urgency, t (38) = 2.2, p = .034.  There was no significant difference in their self-reported 
levels of sensation seeking, t (38) = 1.8, p = .086, and (lack of) perseverence, t (38) = 1.2, 
p = .241.  Participants in the DUI group reported higher levels of impulsivity on the BIS, 
t (38) = 3.2, p = .003.  On the BAARS, DUI offenders reported significantly more ADHD 
symptoms compared to controls, in both the hyperactive/impulsive, t (38) = 2.2, p = .036, 
and inattentive, t (38) = 2.4, p = .021, symptom clusters.  
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Behavioral Measures of Impulsivity    
Money choice task.  Responses on the money choice task were analyzed using t 
tests to compare AUC values.  The control group (M = 0.51, SD = 0.29) and the DUI 
group (M = 0.46, SD = 0.25) were not significantly different, t (38) = 0.6, p = .563.  
Time estimation and production task.  Time interval productions and 
estimations are listed in Table 4.  Data from one participant in the DUI group was lost 
due to experimenter error.   
 Production. Time production values were analyzed using a 2 (group) X 7 
(duration) mixed-design ANOVA.  Neither the main effect of group, F (1, 37) = 0.4, p = 
.532, nor the group X duration interaction, F (6, 222) = 0.7, p = .650, was significant.   
 Estimation. Time estimation values were analyzed using a 2 (group) X 6 
(duration) mixed-design ANOVA.  Neither the main effect of group, F (1, 37) = 0.3, p = 
.532, nor the group X duration interaction, F (6, 185) = 0.2, p = .956, was significant.  
Letter memory task.  LMT performance was analyzed using an independent 
samples t-test.  Participants in the control group recalled 72.3% (SD = 13.7%) of target 
letters, and the DUI group recalled 71.6% (SD = 18.7%) of target letters.  Performance 
did not differ significantly between groups, t (38) = 0.2, p = .881.  
Attentional-bias behavioral activation task.  Performance on the ABBA task 
was analyzed using 2 (group: DUI versus control) X 2 (condition: alcohol go versus 
alcohol no-go) between subjects ANOVA.  
 p - fails.   p-fail rates are graphed in Figure 1.  There was no significant main 
effect of group, F (1, 36)  < 0.1, p = .720, or condition, F (1, 36) = 1.9, p = .181.  The 
group X condition interaction approached significance, F (1, 36) = 3.8, p  = .059.  As 
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seen in Figure 1, this interaction suggests that control participants made more inhibitory 
failures in the alcohol go condition, whereas the effect of condition was less pronounced 
in the DUI group.  Post-hoc t tests confirmed that effect of condition was significant for 
controls, t (18) = 2.1, p = .028, but not among DUI offenders, t (18) = 0.5, p = .623.  
 RT.  RTs are graphed in Figure 1.  There was no significant main effect of DUI 
group, F (1, 36) < 0.1, p = .836.  The main effect of condition was significant, F (1,36) = 
7.2, p = .011.  As seen in Figure 1, this main effect indicates that participants in the 
alcohol go condition responded more quickly than those in the alcohol no-go condition.  
There was no significant group X condition interaction, F (1,36) < 0.1, p = .961. 
Simulated Driving Performance  
 Precision driving task.  Performance on the driving task was analyzed using 
independent samples t tests.  Descriptive data as well as between-group comparisons are 
reported in Table 5.  These comparisons found that participants in the DUI group had 
poorer performance on several driving measures as compared to the control group, 
including standard deviation of lane position, standard deviation of speed, and line 
crossings.   
 Motivational conflict driving task.  Performance on the motivational conflict 
task was analyzed using independent samples t tests.  These data are also presented in 
Table 5.  These comparisons found a significant difference between groups in braking 
distance; however, the direction of this difference was not as expected.  Participants in 
the DUI group had significantly longer braking distances compared to the control group.   
There was no other significant difference in performance.   
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Risk versus Reward Driver Decision Task 
 Data from the RRDD task were analyzed using a 2 (DUI versus control) X 10 
(risk level) mixed-design analysis of variance. One participant in the control group was 
removed from all analyses involving the RRDD task due to quick and invariant 
responding (i.e., responding yes to all scenarios.)  Bar graphs charting the amount of 
money required to drive under each level of risk are presented in Figure 2.  
 Distance to be traveled.  There was a significant main effect of risk level, F (9, 
333) = 15.5, p < .001, confirming that participants required more money to drive as 
distance to be traveled increased.  There was no significant main effect of group, F (1, 
37) = 1.1, p = .302.  The group X risk level interaction was not significant, F (9, 333) = 
0.6, p = .816.  
 Blood alcohol concentration.  There was a significant main effect of risk level, F 
(9, 342) = 42.8, p < .001, confirming that participants required more money to drive as 
blood alcohol concentration increased.  There was no significant main effect of group, F 
(1, 38) = 1.8, p = .190. The group X risk level interaction was not significant, F (9, 342) 
= 0.6, p = .836.  
 Time since drinking.  There was a significant main effect of risk level, F (9, 333) 
= 27.1, p < .001, confirming that participants required more money to drive when less 
time had passed since drinking.  There also was a significant main effect of group, F (1, 
37) = 4.7, p = .036.  An examination of Figure 2 shows that participants in the DUI were 
generally willing to drive for less money under most levels of risk.  The group X risk 
level interaction also was significant, F (9, 333) = 2.1, p = .032.  This interaction was 
probed by examining risk slopes for each group.  The control group (M slope = 17,968; 
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SD slope = 9,537) had a steeper slope than the DUI group (M slope = 12,508; SD slope = 
11,385), although this difference was not statistically significant, t (37) = 1.6, p = .120.  
 Probability of arrest. There was a significant main effect of risk level, F (9, 333) 
= 47.2, p < .001, confirming that participants required more money to drive as the 
likelihood of being arrested increased.  There was no significant main effect of group, F 
(1, 37) = 3.4, p = .074. There was no significant group X risk level interaction, F (9, 333) 
= 0.3, p = .981.  
Discussion 
Study 1 examined impulsivity in DUI offenders using performance-based tasks 
and self-report measures.  It also examined their driving performance using two 
simulated driving scenarios.  In terms of performance on the behavioral measures of 
impulsivity, there were few differences between groups.  There were no group 
differences in performance on the money choice task, letter memory task, or the time 
estimation task.  On the ABBA task, participants in the control group made more 
inhibitory failures when alcohol cues were paired with go targets.  In the DUI group, 
there was no difference in performance between conditions, suggesting that alcohol cues 
did not increase disinhibited responding among these individuals.  This finding runs 
counter to my prediction that DUI offenders would be particularly vulnerable to the 
disinhibiting effects of alcohol cues in this context; however, previous research has 
shown that non-recidivist DUI offenders show attentional avoidance away from alcohol 
cues (Miller & Fillmore, 2014).  Given that most participants in the DUI group (n = 17) 
had a single DUI offense, it is possible that these individuals lack the strong association 
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between alcohol cues and approach behavior thought to produce this disinhibiting effect 
(Fleming & Bartholow, 2014).   
Results of the simulated driving tasks identified several differences in 
performance between the groups.  On the precision driving task, participants in the DUI 
group showed large LPSD and made more line crossings, indicating that these individuals 
tended to drift within their lanes more than did participants in the control group.  
Likewise, DUI offenders showed higher speed SD compared to control, another 
indication of risky driving performance (Groeger, 2000).  Participants’ driving histories 
also supported this conclusion.  DUI participants reported more moving violations than 
did controls, despite driving similar lengths each day and being licensed for a similar 
amount of time.  On the motivational conflict drive, however, driving performance was 
no-more risky in the DUI group compared to the control group.  In fact, contrary to my 
prediction, those in the DUI group initiated braking farther away from red lights than did 
control participants, suggesting greater caution while driving in the DUI offenders.   
Increased brake distance can sometimes occur because a driver is travelling at a 
high rate of speed.  In order to brake effectively at a red light, a driver travelling quickly 
must initiate braking earlier than would a driver traveling at a more moderate speed.  One 
possible explanation for longer braking distance in the DUI group is that they drove more 
quickly than did control participants.  The motivational conflict drive requires rapid shifts 
in speed according to proximity to stoplights.  It is possible that DUI offenders were less 
effective in reducing their speed appropriately when approaching a stoplight, resulting in   
approaching stoplights at a higher rate of speed.  As they approached red lights at this 
higher rate of speed, they would need to begin braking earlier in order to stop.   
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Results of the self-report questionnaires provided new information about the 
subtypes of impulsivity that may contribute to risk for alcohol-impaired driving.  On the 
UPPS, participants in the DUI group reported significantly higher levels of urgency and 
(lack of) premeditation.  There was a smaller group difference in sensation seeking that 
approached significance and no difference between groups in (lack of) perseverance.  
Consistent with prior research, participants in the DUI group also had higher levels of 
impulsiveness on the BIS (Van Dyke & Fillmore, 2014a).  Responses on the BAARS 
showed that DUI offenders report higher rates of ADHD symptoms than did controls, 
suggesting the presence of clinically relevant symptoms of inattention and impulsivity in 
this group. 
Results from the RRDD task provided mixed support for my predictions.  As 
expected, participants required more money to drive as the level of risk associated with 
that decision increased.   Increased risk led participants to require more money to drive in 
all of the presented situational factors.  This finding is important because it demonstrates 
that these factors influence decision making for drinkers when they are deciding whether 
to drive.  In general, participants in the DUI group were willing to drive for less money 
than were controls.  Although this difference was only statistically significant in for one 
situational factor (i.e., time since drinking), similar nonsignificant trends were observed 
in each scenario.   A closer examination of responses to the time since drinking 
situational factor suggest important group differences in response to increasing levels of 
risk.  In the DUI group, there was little difference in money required to drive between 
low (i.e., 4.5-4.0 hours) and moderate (3.5-2.5 hours) levels of risk, suggesting that DUI 
offenders are relatively insensitive to shifts from mild to moderate risk.  Conversely, 
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control participants were sensitive to changes across all levels of risk.  This suggests that 
DUI offenders may be less influenced by variations in this risk factor, particularly when 
these variations occur at the lower ends of the risk spectrum. 
The group differences reported here cannot be attributed to group differences in 
variables such as age, education, or IQ, because there were no significant differences 
between groups on these measures.  Likewise, the groups were relatively similar in terms 
of drinking habits according to the TLFB and PDHQ, suggesting that differences in prior 
alcohol use are unlikely to explain these findings.   
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Table 1.  Risk versus Reward Driver Decision task: Risk factor levels and potential 
monetary rewards 
General Prompt 
We are interested in understanding how much monetary incentive you would need to 
drive after drinking.  Imagine that you have had five drinks while at a bar with a group 
of friends. The bar is closing for the evening. Your car is parked at the bar and you 
have the option of driving to your next destination… 
 
Monetary incentive conditions: $1; $10; $50; $100; $500; $1,000; $5,000; $20,000; 
$100,000; $200,000 
Factor 1: Distance 
Your next destination is [5 miles] away. Would you be willing to drive for [$500]? 
 
Distance scenarios: 1/10 mile, 1 mile, 2 miles, 5 miles, 10 miles, 15 miles, 20 miles, 25 
miles, 30 miles, 50 miles 
Factor 2: Blood alcohol concentration 
The bar provides a free breathalyzer service to its customers. You use the breathalyzer 
and you register a [0.04%] BAC. Would you be willing to drive for [$20,000]? 
 
Blood alcohol concentration scenarios: 0.00%, 0.01%, 0.03%, 0.04%, 0.05%, 0.07%, 
0.09%, 0.11%, 0.15%, 0.20% 
Factor 3: Time since last drink 
It has been [1 hour] since you finished your last drink. Would you be willing to drive 
for [$5,000]?  
 
Time since drinking scenarios: 5 minutes, 30 minutes, 1 hour, 1 hour and 30 minutes, 2 
hours, 2 hours and 30 minutes, 3 hours, 3 hours and 30 minutes, 4 hours, 4 hours and 
30 minutes 
Factor 4: Perceived probability of arrest 
It this part of town, [1] out of every [100] intoxicated drivers will be arrested. Would 
you be willing to drive for [$10]? 
 
Perceived probability of arrest scenarios: 1/500; 1/100; 1/50; 1/20; 1/10; 1/5; 1/2; 2/3; 
3/4; 9/10.  
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Table 2. Demographics, drinking habits, and driving history 
         
Group    
               
      Control (n = 20)      DUI (n = 20) 
                  Mean        SD     Mean       SD 
                 
Demographic                
      Age   24.9    3.7   23.4   2.7 
      Gender (% male) 65.0       70.0    
      Education  15.9  1.9  15.7  1.6 
      IQ: Verbal 103.4   11.3   101.3   10.3 
      IQ: Nonverbal 102.8   11.3   103.8   13.2 
      IQ: Composite 103.9   10.8   103.3   11.6 
Drinking Habits              
      TLFB               
  Drinking Days 29.4   12.7   34.2   14.5 
  Total Drinks 111.7   92.6   152.2   63.1 
  Drunk Days 8.1   10.2   12.3   7.8 
  Binge Days 7.0   8.8   10.2   8.9 
      PDHQ         
  Frequency 2.2   0.9   2.6   1.5 
  Quantity 3.5   2.0   4.4   1.9 
  Months 87.6   47.0   81.2   37.4 
      SCID         
  Abuse 0.8   1.1   3.5   0.9 
  Dependence 1.1   1.4   2.8   1.3 
Driving History         
  Drive Months 94.0   48.6   78.8   38.0 
  Distance 14.8   10.3   13.8   8.5 
  Tickets 0.9   1.1   2.4   1.2 
  Collision 0.7   0.8   1.2   1.2 
Note.  Age is reported in years. TLFB = Timeline follow-back. PDHQ = Personal 
Drinking Habits Questionnaire.  SCID = Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV.  
Drive months = number of months since first operating a motor vehicle.  Distance = 
number of miles driven daily. Tickets = number of moving violations received.  
Collisions = number of motor vehicle collisions in which the participant has been 
involved.  
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Table 3. Self-reported impulsivity by group 
         
Group    
   
                   
      Control (n = 20)      DUI (n = 20)   
                  Mean        SD     Mean       SD  t 
                     
UPPS           
      Premeditation   1.8   0.4  2.2  0.6  2.5*
      Urgency 1.9  0.4  2.2  0.5  2.2*
      Sens Seeking 3.1  0.6  3.4  0.5     1.8  
      Perseverance 1.7  0.3  1.9  0.5     1.2 
BAARS         
     IA 0.3  0.8  1.3  1.8  2.1*
     HI 0.8  1.2  2.0  2.0  2.2*
     TOT 1.1  1.6  3.2  3.3  2.5*
BIS 57.4  9.1  68.2  12.2  3.2*
Note. UPPS = UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale, BAARS = Barkley Adults ADHD Self-
Report Scale, IA = Inattentive symptom count,  HI = Hyperactive/Impulsive symptom 
count, TOT = Total symptom count, BIS = Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 
Comparisons are independent sample t tests. *p < .05. 
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Table 4. Time estimation and production task performance by group 
  Group 
  Control  DUI 
Duration 
(sec) 
 
M SD  M SD 
       
   Production       
2  1.67 0.39  1.81 0.46 
4  3.25 1.06  3.67 0.99 
8  6.83 1.63  7.34 1.96 
16  12.48 3.33  14.15 4.09 
24  21.91 5.03  20.35 5.97 
32  26.38 7.53  30.14 9.26 
64  54.73 6.98  56.43 16.82 
       
   Estimation       
4  4.40 1.31  5.26 3.75 
12   15.50 6.69  16.53 11.91 
15  16.30 5.02  19.32 11.31 
45  43.20 8.42  49.47 22.45 
60  62.70 13.64  63.84 26.88 
90  91.20 34.57  93.90 32.61 
Note. Values are produced and estimated time intervals in seconds.
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Figure 1. Mean (+ SE) RT and p-fail on the ABBA task by group 
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Figure 2. Money required to drive on the Risk versus Reward Driver Decision task.  
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Figure 2 (cont). Money required to drive on the Risk versus Reward Driver Decision task.  
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Chapter 3
Acute Effects of Alcohol and Expectancy Manipulation on Driving Performance and 
Decision Making in DUI offenders 
(Experiment 2)  
Introduction 
 The decision to drive after drinking is, by definition, made in an intoxicated state.  
Little research, however, has examined how acute alcohol intoxication influences 
behaviors and decision-making processes related to drunk driving.  Prior work has shown 
that DUI offenders may underestimate the degree to which alcohol impairs their driving 
performance (Van Dyke & Fillmore, 2014b), suggesting that there may be important 
differences in acute alcohol effects between those arrested for DUI and their 
nonoffending peers that may contribute to their decision-making processes.  Further, 
Experiment 1 confirmed the presence of heightened impulsivity and poorer driving 
performance while sober among DUI offenders, two factors that may contribute to 
maladaptive decision making while intoxicated.  Considering the societal costs of DUI, it 
is also important to identify strategies for reducing the likelihood of impaired driving in 
these individuals.  Experiment 2 sought to identify changes in driving performance and 
decision making that occur under alcohol in DUI offenders.  Another goal of this 
experiment was to test whether expectancy manipulation would be an effective method 
for reducing risk in DUI offenders.  
Laboratory Studies on Acute Alcohol Effects on Driving Performance 
Much of the work done examining how alcohol affects driving performance 
employs naturalistic designs on real-world accident rates in intoxicated drivers (Zador, 
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Krawchuk, & Voas, 2000).  Another useful technique for understanding how alcohol 
acutely affects driving performance is to examine how alcohol directly affects driving 
performance using simulated driving equipment.  Simulated driving in controlled 
laboratory environments affords researchers greater control over dosing and driving-
related conditions that facilitate more nuanced outcome measures compared to 
naturalistic designs.  Such laboratory studies have been instrumental in identifying factors 
that affect drinkers’ level of impairment under alcohol, because the improved control of 
the laboratory allows the experiment to systematically manipulate these variables.  For 
example, laboratory studies using driving simulators have shown that alcohol impairment 
is worsened when the driver is distracted (Harrison & Fillmore, 2011) and when the 
driver is older (Sklar, Boissoneault, Fillmore, & Nixon, 2014).   
 Numerous studies have used this technique to identify groups who are highly 
sensitive to the effects of alcohol on driving performance.  One consistent finding is that 
groups characterized by impulsivity tend to be poorer drivers under alcohol.  Fillmore 
and colleagues (2009) compared the effects of three doses of alcohol (i.e., placebo, 0.45 
g/kg, 0.65 g/kg) on the inhibitory control in high and low sensation-seekers.  The high 
sensation-seeking group showed a larger disruption of inhibitory control under the active 
dose of alcohol compared to the low sensation-seeking group.  Likewise, Fillmore and 
colleagues (2008) examined driving ability and inhibitory control following two doses of 
alcohol (i.e., placebo, 0. 65 g/kg) in a group of moderate social drinkers.  Participants 
with the poorest inhibitory control also showed the poorest driving performance under the 
active alcohol dose.  In a similar study, Weafer et al. (2008) directly showed that adults 
 
43 
 
with ADHD experienced greater disruption of driving performance following than did a 
nonclinical comparison group.   
Perceptions of Alcohol-Induced Driving Impairment 
 The decision to drive after drinking is based, at least in part, on one’s perceived 
level of impairment (Quinn & Fromme, 2012; Thurman, 1986).  Unfortunately, drinkers 
tend to underestimate the degree to which alcohol impairs performance (Aston & Liguori, 
2013; Beirness, 1987), perhaps because acute alcohol intoxication disrupts cognitive 
processes important for accurate self-evaluation (Easdon, Izenberg, Armilio, Yu, & 
Alain, 2005). This mismatch between subjective appraisal of intoxication and objective 
impairment may lead some drinkers to drive despite being impaired by alcohol.   
 The ability to accurately evaluate one’s performance on a task is a critical 
cognitive process when performing demanding tasks such as driving (Holroyd & Coles, 
2002). By monitoring one’s own behavior, people are able to adjust their actions when 
changes are needed to meet environmental demands.  For example, drivers may notice 
that their car is moving too quickly and adjust acceleration and braking patterns to 
produce a more appropriate speed. This process of detecting errors and adjusting 
behavior accordingly is a critical process for optimal performance (Gehring, Goss, Coles, 
Meyer, & Donchin, 1993).  Cognitive neuroscientists have shown that activity in the 
brain regions underlying performance monitoring (e.g., posterior medial frontal cortex, 
anterior cingulate cortex) facilitates trial-and-error learning, presumably by prompting 
strategic adjustments to one’s behavior to improve performance (Ridderinkhof, 
Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuiss, 2004).   
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 Disagreement between subjective and behavioral impairment is pronounced in 
individuals who show deficits in performance monitoring.  Prior research has shown that 
several groups characterized by impulsivity show performance monitoring deficits, 
including individuals with ADHD (Shiels & Hawk, 2010), cocaine dependence (Li, 
Milivojevic, Kemp, Hong, & Sinha, 2006), alcohol dependence (Lawrence, Luty, 
Bogdan, Sahakian, & Clark, 2009), and borderline personality disorder (de Bruijn et al., 
2006).  The presence of performance monitoring deficits in these numerous impulsive 
groups supports other findings for hypofunctionality in brain regions associated with 
performance monitoring in impulsive individuals, suggesting that an impaired ability to 
monitor performance may contribute to trait impulsiveness (Potts, George, Martin, & 
Barratt, 2006).  Further, task-based studies have shown that deficient performance 
monitoring, as evidenced by failure to adjust response strategies following failures, is 
associated with impulsive response-style on these tasks (van Meel, Heslenfeld, 
Oosterlaan, & Sergeant, 2007).   
 In the context of alcohol intoxication, there is evidence that impulsive groups may 
not accurately perceive the degree to which alcohol impairs performance on skill-based 
tasks.  Weafer and colleagues (2008) found that adults with ADHD rated themselves as 
less impaired by alcohol than controls despite objective indicators showing that they were 
in fact more impaired.  Van Dyke and Fillmore (2014b) compared driving performance of 
DUI offenders and nonoffending controls following placebo and 0.64 g/kg alcohol.  
Results of the study found that driving performance was impaired by alcohol in both 
groups to a similar extent, suggesting that DUI offenders are no more impaired by 
alcohol than controls.  Despite the lack of group difference in terms of behavioral 
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impairment, DUI offenders perceived themselves as less impaired following alcohol and 
reported greater willingness to drive than did controls.  Considering the importance of 
perceived impairment for deciding to drive after drinking, intervention strategies that 
address this deficit in self-evaluation may be helpful for reducing risk of impaired 
driving.  One possible strategy for doing so is challenging drinkers’ alcohol expectancies.   
Alcohol Expectancies 
 Alcohol expectancies are beliefs individuals hold about the effects that alcohol 
will have on their behavior.  These beliefs can be positive (e.g., alcohol increases 
sociability) or negative (e.g., alcohol causes hangover), and they are formed based on 
direct or indirect experience with alcohol (Jones, Corbin, & Fromme, 2001).  Alcohol 
expectancies have been widely studied because they play an important role in governing 
people’s behavior related to alcohol use. For example, people who hold more favorable 
alcohol expectancies are more likely to transition from non-problem drinking to problem 
drinking over a 12 month period (Christiansen, Roehling, Smith, & Goldman, 1989). 
Other studies have found similar associations between drinkers’ alcohol expectancies and 
their quantity/frequency of alcohol use (Fromme & D'Amico, 2000; Sher, Wood, Wood, 
& Raskin, 1996).  
 Recognizing the relation between alcohol expectancies and alcohol use behavior, 
clinical researchers have attempted to develop intervention strategies to alter expectancies 
in a way that reduces alcohol use.  In a human laboratory study, Sharkansky and Finn 
(1998) showed that participants who were given the expectancy that alcohol would 
impair their performance on a cognitive task consumed less alcohol when given ad 
libitum access. Likewise, priming drinkers with positive alcohol expectancies increases 
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their ad libitum alcohol consumption (Roehrich & Goldman, 1995).  Clinical trials of 
interventions that aimed at modifying drinkers’ alcohol expectancies have shown that 
such interventions can reduce subsequent drinking (Dunn, Lau, & Cruz, 2000; Wood, 
Capone, Laforge, Erickson, & Brand, 2007). These studies show that changing drinkers’ 
expectancies is an effective method for changing people’s behavior related to alcohol use. 
 The link between alcohol expectancies and behavior is also present in the context 
of alcohol-impaired driving: People who expect that alcohol will impair their ability to 
drive are less likely to drive after drinking than those who do not hold this belief. 
McCarthy and colleagues have shown in two studies that adolescents and young adults 
who view alcohol as being less detrimental for driving ability endorse frequently driving 
after drinking (McCarthy, Lynch, & Pedersen, 2007; McCarthy et al., 2006). Likewise, 
DUI offenders who expect that alcohol intoxication increases their risk of accidents are 
more likely to drive after drinking that those who do not (Aberg, 1993).   
Expectations of Impairment and Acute Alcohol Effects 
Most of the research on alcohol expectancies has focused on understanding how 
these expectancies influence people’s decisions to use alcohol in different contexts.  
Another line of research has shown that expectancies also can alter a drinker’s behavior 
after drinking.  Specifically, when individuals hold the expectation that alcohol will 
disrupt their performance on a given task, they will compensate for this expected 
impairment by increasing effort or using alternative behavioral strategies, particularly 
when impairment is undesirable in that context. Classic examples of this phenomenon are 
described by Goldberg and Havard (1968), wherein intoxicated drivers who have been 
stopped by police were able to compensate against the disruptive effects of alcohol long 
 
47 
 
enough to pass a field sobriety test, despite clear outward signs of alcohol intoxication.  
Subsequent empirical studies in this area have confirmed that beliefs and events that 
occur after a drinker has consumed alcohol can influence the behavioral effects of the 
drug (Vogel-Sprott & Sdao-Jarvie, 1989).  
 Research in this area has been conducted using dose-response paradigms in which 
participants receive alcohol challenge and perform skill-based behavioral tasks.  They are 
then given information that alcohol should impair performance on an upcoming 
behavioral task (Fillmore & Blackburn, 2002; Fillmore, Roach, & Rice, 2002).  An 
example of an experimental method for manipulating participants’ alcohol expectancies 
is as follows.  Participants first receive a dose of alcohol.  After they consume the drug, 
the experimenter provides them with information that the dose of alcohol they just 
received has caused significant impairment on an upcoming behavioral task among other 
participants.  Participants then complete the task and performance is compared between 
participants in the expectancy manipulation condition and those in an alcohol only 
comparison condition.  
 These studies reliably show that participants who receive the expectancy 
treatment are less impaired by alcohol relative to those who did not receive such 
expectancies.  Fillmore & Vogel-Sprott (1996) used this experimental design to examine 
the effects of 0.56 g/kg alcohol and expectancies on a psychomotor coordination task. 
They found that participants who received the expectancy manipulation alongside the 
alcohol dose performed similarly to the no beverage control group, whereas the alcohol 
only group showed appreciable alcohol impairment.  Further evidence that this protective 
effective of expectancies results from a compensatory behavioral response against the 
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expected impairment comes from studies using placebo control conditions.  Fillmore and 
Blackburn (2002) examined the effects of an expectancy manipulation on participants 
who received a placebo beverage.  In this study, participants received a placebo beverage 
and half were informed that the dose of alcohol they received would result in a slowing of 
response time on a speeded response task.  Participants who received the expectancy 
treatment responded more quickly than those in a no beverage control group.  This 
finding indicates that the compensatory response caused by expectancy manipulation can 
occur independently of any pharmacological factors.   
Acute Alcohol Effects on Decision Making 
It is also important to determine whether an acute dose of alcohol changes how 
situational characteristics influence the decision to drive after drinking.  The alcohol 
myopia model (Steele & Josephs, 1990) proposes that alcohol reduces the amount of 
information that can be processed and evaluated in a situation. This restriction of 
information processing capacity results in a state of shortsightedness in which immediate 
and highly salient cues in the environment exert greater influence over behavior than 
peripheral cues. As such, acute alcohol intoxication may increase the degree to which 
potential for reward (e.g., quick transportation to next location) influences the decision to 
drive after drinking.  Likewise, less salient situational factors (e.g., perceived risk of 
being caught) may become less influential in an intoxicated state. To test this notion, 
MacDonald et al. (1995) conducted a laboratory study examining willingness to drive 
after drinking in sober and intoxicated adults. Although there were no differences in basic 
attitudes towards drinking and driving, the intoxicated adults were reportedly more 
willing to drive when immediate loss or gain was associated with the decision. This study 
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demonstrates how an acute alcohol dose can change how drinkers evaluate situational 
information when deciding whether to drive after drinking. 
Experiment 2 
 Experiment 2 examined how acute doses of alcohol affected driving performance 
and decision-making processes in DUI offenders and their nonoffending peers.  This 
experiment also examined whether creating expectations of alcohol impairment in 
participants changed their driving performance under alcohol or factors related to their 
decision making.  Participants completed precision and motivational conflict driving 
tasks and the RRDD, and they provided subjective ratings of willingness and ability to 
drive during three separate sessions.  During the first two dose-challenge sessions, 
participants received 0.64 g/kg alcohol and placebo before completing the tasks.  For the 
third session (0.64 g/kg alcohol + expectancy manipulation), participants received 0.64 
g/kg alcohol and received sham performance feedback (i.e., expectancy manipulation) 
indicating that their driving performance during the prior sessions was significantly 
impaired by alcohol.  The 0.64 g/kg alcohol dose was selected because it was expected to 
produce a peak BAC of 80 mg/100 ml, which is the legal limit for driving in the United 
States. Three sets of hypotheses were offered:  
 Acute effects of alcohol. Based on prior work, I predicted that 0.64 g/kg alcohol 
would impair driving performance in both groups compared to placebo (Fillmore et al., 
2009).  On the RRDD task, I predicted that 0.64 g/kg alcohol would decreased average 
money required to drive and risk slope compared to placebo (MacDonald, Zanna, & Fong 
1995), indicative of riskier decision making following the active alcohol dose.  I also 
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predicted that 0.64 g/kg alcohol would reduce participants’ perceived willingness and 
ability to drive compared to placebo.   
 Effects of expectancy manipulation.  I hypothesized that participants would be 
less impaired by 0.64 g/kg alcohol following expectancy manipulation relative to 0.64 
g/kg alcohol with no expectancy manipulation.  On the RRDD task, I predicted that 
average money required to drive and risk slope would both increase following 0.64 g/kg 
alcohol + expectancy manipulation compared to 0.64 g/kg with no expectancy 
manipulation.  I also predicted that participants would report lower willingness and 
ability to drive following 0.64 g/kg alcohol + expectancy manipulation compared to 0.64 
g/kg alcohol with no expectancy manipulation.    
 Differential effects in DUI offenders and control participants. I did not predict 
that DUI offenders would show more impairment under alcohol compared to controls 
(Van Dyke & Fillmore, 2014a).  I predicted that relative to control participants, 
participants in the DUI group would show a larger shift towards riskier decision making 
(i.e., lower average money required to drive and risk slope) following 0.64 g/kg alcohol 
compared to placebo.  I predicted that the group differences in RRDD variables would 
smaller in the 0.64 g/kg alcohol + expectancy condition compared to 0.64 g/kg alcohol 
with no expectancy manipulation.  I predicted that DUI offenders would report being less 
impaired and more willing to drive following 0.64 g/kg alcohol than controls.  I predicted 
that this difference in perceived driving fitness would be reduced following 0.64 g/kg 
alcohol + expectancy.  To determine whether this hypothesized group difference in 
perceived driving fitness could be attributed to lower alcohol sensitivity in the DUI 
group, I assessed subjective alcohol effects unrelated to perceived driving impairment 
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(i.e., subjective “liking”, “feeling”, and “desire”).  I predicted that there would be no 
group differences in these subjective alcohol effects in any condition.   
Method 
Participants  
Participants in this experiment were the same as those in experiment 1.  See pages 
24 - 25 and Table 2 of this dissertation for participant characteristics.   
Materials and Measures 
 Most materials used in this experiment (i.e., stimulated driving tasks, RRDD task) 
were described previously in the method section of Experiment 1 (pp. 15-24).  
 Visual-analogue scale. Participants rated the degree to which their driving ability 
was impaired by the alcohol and their willingness to drive. They did so using a visual 
analog scale (VAS) by placing a vertical line on a 100-mm horizontal line ranging from 0 
mm (not at all) to 100 mm (very much).  A similar scale was used for participants to rate 
how much they felt the alcohol, how much they liked the effects of the alcohol, and how 
much they desired more alcohol.   
Procedure 
 Familiarization session. Participants attended a familiarization session during 
which they provided informed consent and were screened to ensure that they met criteria 
for the experiment.  
 Dose-challenge sessions. Participants first completed a presession checklist to 
ensure compliance with the study requirements. They provided a urine sample that was 
tested for the presence of drug metabolites (ICUP Drug Screen, Instant Technologies) 
and, for women, human chorionic gonadotropin in order to verify that they were not 
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pregnant (Icon25 Hcg Urine test, Beckman Coulter).  Participants were instructed to 
abstain from consuming any alcohol 24 hours prior to each session.  Expired air samples 
were taken at the beginning of the session to verify zero BAC (Intoxilyzer, Model 400; 
CMI, Owensboro, KY).  They also were instructed to fast 4 hours prior to each dose-
challenge session.  
 Participants completed the tasks under the following conditions: 0.64 g/kg alcohol 
(alcohol session), 0.64 g/kg alcohol + expectancy treatment (alcohol + expectancy 
session), and placebo. Following the 0.64 g/kg alcohol doses, a peak BAC of 80 mg/100 
ml was expected to occur approximately 75 minutes after dose administration.  This dose 
was selected because it corresponds to the legal limit of intoxication in the United States, 
so it is important to understand how this dose of alcohol affects drivers.  Doses were 
calculated based on body weight. Dose order was partially randomized.  The 0.64 g/kg 
alcohol and placebo sessions were completed first and second in a counterbalanced order, 
and the 0.64 g/kg alcohol + expectancy session was completed last.  This order was 
necessary to avoid carryover effects of the expectancy manipulation.  The alcohol 
beverage was served as one part alcohol and three parts carbonated mix divided equally 
into two glasses. The placebo consisted of four parts carbonated mix that matched the 
volume of the 0.64 g/kg dose. Five ml of alcohol was floated on the top of each placebo 
glass, and the glasses was sprayed with an alcohol mist that resembles condensation and 
provides a strong alcohol odor.  Participants were instructed to consume the first serving 
within two minutes and the second serving within six minutes.  
 The timeline of each dose challenge session was identical. Participants completed 
the precision driving task, motivational conflict driving task, subjective effect 
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questionnaire, and each scenario of the RRDD task, between 30 and 65 minutes past 
dose, which corresponds to the ascending limb of the BAC curve.  Expired air samples 
were used to estimate participants’ BACs throughout the session. Following the testing 
session, participants remained at leisure in a lounge area until their BAC fell to 20 mg/ 
100 ml or below, at which time they were offered transportation home.  They were 
verbally instructed not to drive for several hours following their release from the 
laboratory.  
 Expectancy treatment.  During the alcohol + expectancy manipulation session, 
participants received information that they showed pronounced impairment during the 
alcohol only session.  Participants experienced the session as identical to the placebo and 
0.64 g/kg alcohol session with the exception that they received this sham performance 
feedback.  Immediately following the administration of the alcohol dose, the 
experimenter casually approached the participant and invited them to look at a graph 
displayed on a PC.  This graph ostensibly illustrated their severe level of impairment (see 
Figure 3).  The experimenter then explained the meaning of the graph, verbally 
confirmed that the participant understood its meaning, and provided additional 
clarification if necessary.  The experimenter then left the participant to absorb the alcohol 
and the session proceeded in the same fashion as the previous two.  This method of 
expectancy manipulation is similar to that used in prior research (Fillmore & Vogel-
Sprott, 1996).  
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Results 
Observed BACs 
 BACs in the active dose conditions were analyzed by a 2 group (DUI versus 
control) X 2 condition (0.64 g/kg alcohol versus 0.64 g/kg alcohol + expectancy) X 2 
time (25 minutes past dose versus 65 minutes past dose) mixed-design ANOVA.  There 
was a main effect of time, F (1,38) = 119.8, p < .001, due to the increase in BAC that 
occurred from the first to second measurement.  There was no significant main effect of 
group or condition or interaction effect (ps > .100).  BACs are listed separately by group 
and condition in Table 6.  No detectable BAC was observed following placebo beverage.   
Precision Driving Scenario 
Driving performance on the precision driving task is displayed in Table 7.  These 
data were analyzed using 2 (group) X 3 (condition) ANOVAs.  As seen in this table, 
there were no significant main effects of group or group X condition interactions.  There 
were, however, significant main effects of condition on LPSD, steering rate, and line 
crossings. These effects were probed using a priori t tests.  Because there was no 
significant main effect or interaction effect involving group, these a priori t tests 
collapsed across group.  Analysis of LPSD shows that compared to placebo, participants 
had higher LPSD under 0.64 g/kg alcohol, t (39) = 3.3, p = .002, and 0.64 g/kg alcohol + 
expectancy manipulation, t (39) = 3.6, p < .001.  There was no significant difference in 
LPSD following 0.64 g/kg alcohol and 0.64 g/kg alcohol + expectancy manipulation, t 
(39) = 0.7, p = 0.478.   
A priori t tests also probed the effects of dose and expectancy manipulation on 
steering rate.  Compared to placebo, participants had higher steering rate following 0.64 
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g/kg alcohol, t (39) = 2.2, p = .032, but not 0.64 g/kg alcohol + expectancy, t (39) = 2.0, p 
= .056.  However, there was no significant difference following 0.64 g/kg alcohol with 
and without expectancy manipulation, t (39) = 1.3, p = .216.  
Lastly, a priori t tests probed the effects of dose and expectancy manipulation on 
line crossings.  Compared to placebo, participants made more line crossings following 
0.64 g/kg alcohol, t (39) = 3.3, p = .002, and 0.64 g/kg alcohol + expectancy, t (39) = 3.4, 
p = .002.  There was no significant difference following 0.64 g/kg alcohol with and 
without expectancy manipulation, t (39) = 0.4, p = .693.  
Motivational Conflict Driving Scenario 
 Driving performance on the motivation conflict drive are presented in Table 8.  
These data were analyzed using 2 (group) X 3 (condition) mixed-design ANOVAs.  As 
seen in this table, there was a main effect of condition on LPSD, average speed, and 
braking distance.  There was also a main effect of group on speed standard deviation and 
traffic tickets, showing that participants in the DUI group had higher speed standard 
deviation and received more traffic violations compared to controls.  No group X 
condition interaction was significant.  Significant effects of condition were probed using 
a priori t tests.  Because there was no significant main effect of group or group X 
condition interaction on LPSD, data were collapsed across group.  Compared to placebo, 
participants had higher LPSD following 0.64 g/kg alcohol, t (39) = 4.2, p < .001, and 0.64 
g/kg alcohol + expectancy, t (39) = 6.3, p < .001.  There was no significant difference in 
performance following 0.64 g/kg alcohol with and without expectancy manipulation, t 
(39) = 1.0, p = .341.   
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 The main effect of condition on average speed was probed using a priori t tests.  
There was no significant difference in average speed following placebo and 0.64 g/kg 
alcohol, t (39) = 0.4, p = .681.  However, participants drove more quickly following 0.64 
g/kg alcohol + expectancy compared to placebo, t (39) = 3.2, p = .003.  The difference 
between 0.64 g/kg alcohol with and without expectancy manipulation was also 
significant, t (39) = 2.2, p = .032.  
  The main effect of condition on line crossings was probed using a priori t tests, 
Compared to placebo, participants made more line crossings following 0.64 g/kg alcohol, 
t (39) = 2.9, p = .006, and 0.64 g/kg alcohol + expectancy, t (39) = 2.7, p = .011.  There 
was no significant difference following 0.64 g/kg alcohol with and without expectancy 
manipulation, t (39) = 0.8, p = .436.   
 The main effect of condition on braking distance was probed using a priori t tests.  
Compared to placebo, participants had a shorter braking distance following 0.64 g/kg 
alcohol, t (39) = 2.6, p = .012, and 0.64 g/kg alcohol + expectancy, t (39) = 3.6, p = .001.  
There was no significant difference in braking distance following 0.64 g/kg alcohol with 
and without expectancy manipulation, t (39) = 0.8, p = .406. 
Perceived Driving Fitness 
 Participants’ ratings of perceived willingness and ability to drive are graphed in 
Figure 4.  Rating were analyzed using 2 (group) X 3 (condition) mixed-design ANOVAs.  
For perceived ability to drive, there was a significant main effect of condition, F (2, 76) = 
139.9, p < .001, and the main effect of group approached significance, F (1, 38) = 3.3, p 
= .079.  There was a significant group X condition interaction, F (2, 76) = 5.2, p = .008.   
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This interaction was probed using a priori t tests.  These t tests found that within 
the control group, perceived ability to drive following placebo was significantly higher 
than following both 0.64 g/kg alcohol, t (19) = 10.2, p < .001, and 0.64 g/kg alcohol + 
expectancy, t (19) = 11.6, p < .001.  In the control group there was no significant 
difference between perceived ability to drive following 0.64 g/kg alcohol with and 
without the expectancy manipulation, t (19) = 0.8, p = .448. In the DUI group, perceived 
ability to drive following placebo was higher than following 0.64 g/kg alcohol, t (19) = 
10.6, p < .001, and 0.64 g/kg alcohol + expectancy, t (19) = 10.9, p < .001. In the DUI 
group, perceived ability to drive following 0.64 g/kg alcohol + expectancy was lower 
than following 0.64 g/kg alcohol with no expectancy manipulation, t (19) = 2.9, p = .009.  
These tests also showed that the DUI group had significantly higher perceived driving 
ability ratings than did controls following 0.64 g/kg, t (38) = 2.9, p = .006.  They did not 
differ from controls following placebo, t (38) = 0.8, p = .423, or 0.64 g/kg alcohol + 
expectancy, t (19) = 1.2, p = .249.  
For willingness to drive, there was a significant main effect of condition, F (2, 76) 
= 96.7, p < .001, but no significant main effect of group, F (1, 38) = 1.9, p = .964.  The 
group X condition interaction was significant, F (2, 76) = 10.7, p < .001. This interaction 
was probed using a priori t tests.  In the control group, willingness to drive following 
placebo was significantly higher than following 0.64 g/kg alcohol, t (19) = 10.4, p <.001, 
and 0.64 g/kg alcohol + expectancy, t (19) = 10.4, p <.001.  However, there was no 
significant difference in willingness to drive following 0.64 g/kg alcohol with and 
without expectancy manipulation, t (19) = 0.4, p =.682.  Among DUI offenders, 
willingness to drive following placebo was significantly higher than following 0.64 g/kg 
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alcohol, t (19) = 6.1, p <.001, and 0.64 g/kg alcohol + expectancy, t (19) = 4.5, p <.001.  
There was no significant difference in willingness to drive following 0.64 g/kg alcohol 
with and without expectancy manipulation, t (19) = 0.5, p =.656.  Additional t tests 
comparing groups on willingness to driving within each session showed that DUI 
offenders were less willing to drive than controls following placebo, t (38) = 2.4, p = 
.020.  There was no significant difference between DUI offenders and controls following 
0.64 g/kg alcohol, t (38) = 1.9, p = .065, and 0.64 g/kg alcohol + expectancy, t (19) = 1.7, 
p = .099.  
Subjective Alcohol Effects 
 Participant’s subjective ratings of alcohol effects on the VAS are reported in 
Table 9.  As seen in this table, there was a main effect of condition on subjecting ratings 
of “feeling”, “liking” and “desire,” but there was no significant main effect of group or 
interaction effect.  
Risk and Reward Driver Decision Task 
 The primary outcome variables of the driving risk tasks slope and mean are 
graphed in Figures 5 and 6, respectively.  Data from one participant in the control group 
was removed from the analyses due to content irrelevant responding.  Effects of condition 
on responses on the driving risk task were analyzed using 2 (group) X 3 (condition) 
mixed-design ANOVAs.  Any significant main effect of condition or interaction effect 
was probed using a priori t tests.   
Distance to be traveled.  There was no significant main effect of group on 
average money required to drive, F (1, 37) = 2.1, p = .152, or risk slope, F (1, 37) = 2.3, p 
= .136.  There was no significant effect of condition on mean, F (2, 74) = 1.3, p = .277, or 
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slope, F (2, 74) = 0.1, p = .862.  The group X condition interaction was not significant for 
average money required to drive, F (2, 74) = 1.0, p = .370, but there was a significant 
group X condition interaction of risk slope, F (2, 74) = 3.4, p = .040.  
The significant group X condition interaction on risk slope was probed using a 
priori t tests. These tests found that within the control group, there was no significant 
difference in risk slope following placebo compared to 0.64 g/kg alcohol, t (18) = 2.0, p = 
.067, or 0.64 g/kg alcohol + expectancy, t (18) = 1.2, p = .230.  There was no significant 
difference in risk slope following 0.64 g/kg alcohol with and without expectancy 
manipulation, t (18) = 0.8, p = .417. In the DUI group, there no significant difference in 
risk slope following placebo compared to 0.64 g/kg alcohol, t (19) = 1.8, p = .086, or 0.64 
g/kg alcohol + expectancy, t (19) = 0.5, p = .643.  Likewise, there was no significant 
difference in risk slope following 0.64 g/kg alcohol with and without expectancy 
manipulation, t (19) = 1.1, p = .287.   
Blood alcohol concentration.  There was no significant main effect of group on 
average money required to drive, F (1, 37) = 3.0, p = .089, or risk slope, F (1, 37) = 2.8, p 
= .102.  There was no significant effect of condition on average money required to drive, 
F (2, 74) = 0.5, p = .586, or risk slope, F (2, 74) = 0.2, p = .799.  The group X condition 
interaction was not significant for average money required to drive, F (2, 74) = 0.5, p = 
.624, or risk slope, F (2, 74) = 0.2, p = .825.  
 Time since drinking.  There was no significant main effect of group on average 
money required to drive, F (1, 37) = 3.4, p = .073, or risk slope, F (1, 37) = 1.7, p = .199.  
There was no significant effect of condition on average money required to drive, F (2, 
74) = 1.8, p = .181, or risk slope, F (2, 74) = 0.8, p = .455.  The group X condition 
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interaction was not significant for average money required to drive, F (2, 74) = 1.0, p = 
.385, or risk slope, F (2, 74) = 1.6, p = .204. 
 Probability of arrest.  There was a significant main effect of group on risk slope, 
F (1, 37) = 5.2, p = .028. As seen in Figure 5, participants in the control group showed a 
steeper slope compared to those in the DUI group.  There was no significant main effect 
of group on average money required to drive, F (1, 37) = 2.6, p = .119.  There was no 
significant effect of condition on average money required to drive, F (2, 74) < 0.1, p = 
.967, or risk slope, F (2, 74) = 1.6, p = .218.  The group X condition interaction was not 
significant for average money required to drive, F (2, 74) = 2.0, p = .138, or risk slope, F 
(2, 74) = 0.6 p = .539.  
Discussion 
 Experiment 2 examined the acute effects of alcohol on simulated driving 
performance and decision-making processes related to alcohol intoxicated driving in DUI 
offenders and nonoffending controls.  It also examined the effects of expectancy 
manipulation on driving performance and decision-making (Vogel-Sprott, 1992).  My 
first set of hypotheses were associated with the acute effects of alcohol on driving 
performance and decision making.  In general, the hypothesis that 0.64 g/kg alcohol 
would impair driving performance was supported.  On the precision driving task, 
participants showed increased LPSD, steer rate, and line crossings following 0.64 g/kg 
alcohol compared to placebo, consistent with the notion that alcohol increases within-lane 
drift.  A similar pattern was observed on the motivational conflict-driving task.  
Following 0.64 g/kg alcohol, participants showed increased LPSD and steer rate 
compared to placebo.  0.64 g/kg alcohol also shortened breaking distance on the 
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motivational conflict drive, a change that is indicative of a riskier driving style.  The 
hypotheses that 0.64 g/kg would cause riskier decision-making was not supported.  
Participants did not become willing to tolerate more risk for less money after receiving 
0.64 g/kg alcohol compared to placebo.  As expected, participants reported lower 
perceived ability and willingness to drive following 0.64 g/kg alcohol compared to 
placebo. 
 The second set of hypotheses addressed the effect of expectancy manipulation on 
simulated driving performance and decision-making on the RRDD task.    
Contrary to my hypotheses, there was no evidence for an effect of expectancy 
manipulation on any measure of driving performance.  In fact, the only significant effect 
in these comparisons indicated higher risk driving following expectancy manipulation.  In 
the motivational conflict drive, participants drove faster following 0.64 g/kg alcohol + 
expectancy compared to 0.64 g/kg alcohol.  The likely has to do with session order rather 
than any effect of expectancy manipulation.  Participants always completed the alcohol 
expectancy + 0.64 g/kg alcohol after both other sessions, so they may have increased 
their speed as they become more familiar with the motivational conflict task in order to 
maximize their amount of money earned.  The hypothesis that expectancy manipulation 
would decrease decision-making risk was not supported.  Responses on the RRDD task 
did not appear to be affected by expectancy manipulation.   
  The final set of hypotheses concerned group differences in the effects of alcohol 
and expectancy manipulation on simulated driving ability, decision making, and 
perceived ability and willingness to drive.  There was no group difference in alcohol 
effects on the simulated driving tasks, replicating prior work suggesting that DUI 
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offenders are no more impaired by alcohol than their nonoffending peers (Van Dyke & 
Fillmore, 2014b).  Neither 0.64 g/kg alcohol nor expectancy manipulation altered 
responses on the RRDD task; both groups were equally unaffected by these 
manipulations on the measures of decision making.  There were, however, several group 
differences in responses on this task.  When considering probability of arrest on the 
RRDD task, DUI offenders had a smaller risk slope compared to controls overall.  This 
pattern suggests that DUI offenders need less incentive to ignore riskier situations when 
the risk factor in question is probability of being arrested.   
There were important group differences in the effects of alcohol and expectancy 
manipulation on perceived driving fitness (e.g., self-reported ability to drive).  Both 
groups showed decreased perceived driving ability following 0.64 g/kg alcohol compared 
to placebo; however, control participants rated themselves as less able to drive in this 
condition compared to DUI offenders.  This finding is consistent with prior work 
showing that DUI offenders perceive themselves as less impaired by alcohol, despite 
showing similar levels of behavioral impairment (Van Dyke & Fillmore, 2014b).  
Interestingly, in the 0.64 g/kg alcohol + expectancy condition, DUI offenders’ perceived 
ability to drive was similar to that of controls.  This finding cannot be attributed to 
general group differences in sensitivity to the subjective effects of alcohol, because there 
were no other group differences in other subjective alcohol effects (i.e., subjective 
feeling, liking, and desire for more alcohol).  Taken together, these finding supported my 
hypothesis and suggests that the expectancy manipulation used in the current study was 
effective at changing DUI offenders’ perceptions of their driving ability to be more 
consistent with that of nonoffenders.    
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 Results of this study cannot be attributed to group differences in demographic 
variables or drinking history, because the groups were matched on these variables (see 
Experiment 1).  The carefully controlled weight-adjusted dosing procedure ensured that 
BACs that were similar between groups and sessions.  Expired air samples confirmed that 
participants achieved similar BACs before and after completing the tasks during each 
session in which alcohol was administered.   
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Table 6. Blood alcohol concentrations by group and condition 
  Condition 
  0.64 g/kg  0.64 g/kg + Expectancy 
  M SD  M SD 
Control       
25 min  63.4 16.6  56.8 12.4 
65 min  80.2 11.0  79.0 13.5 
DUI       
25 min  58.2 15.0  57.9 12.5 
65 min   80.1 11.5  83.7 7.9 
 
Note.  BAC values are reported in mg/100 ml. Min = minutes past dose.  
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Figure 3. Sham graph used to manipulate expectation of alcohol impairment  
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Figure 4.  Effects of alcohol and expectancy manipulation on perceived ability and 
willingness to drive. Asterisks (*) indicate significant differences between DUI offenders 
and control participants under the corresponding condition.  
  
*
*
 
70 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Effects of alcohol and expectancy manipulation on risk slope on Risk versus 
Reward Driver Decision task 
 
71 
 
 
 
Figure 5 (cont). Effects of alcohol and expectancy manipulation on risk slope on Risk 
versus Reward Driver Decision task 
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Figure 6.  Effects of alcohol and expectancy manipulation on average money required to 
drive on Risk versus Reward Driver Decision task  
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Figure 6 (cont.) Effects of alcohol and expectancy manipulation on average money 
required to drive on Risk versus Reward Driver Decision task  
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Chapter 4: General Discussion 
 This pair of studies examined characteristics of DUI offenders that may place 
them at risk for impaired driving.  Experiment 1 examined impulsivity, simulated driving 
performance, and decision-making related to alcohol-impaired driving in this group.  DUI 
offenders showed poorer driving performance and reported higher levels of impulsivity 
compared to controls, although they did not perform more poorly on behavioral measures 
of impulsivity.  On the RRDD task, DUI offenders’ responses were indicative of riskier 
decision making compared to control participants.  Experiment 2 extended this research 
on DUI offenders by examining the acute effects of alcohol and expectancy manipulation 
on simulated driving performance and decision making in this group.  Alcohol impaired 
driving performance in both groups but did not affect responses on the RRDD task.  DUI 
offenders rated themselves as more able to drive under 0.64 g/kg alcohol compared to 
controls.  Following expectancy manipulation at this same dose of alcohol, however, DUI 
offenders rated themselves no more able to drive than did control participants.  
Impulsivity in DUI Offenders 
 This research is predicated on previous findings that DUI offenders are more 
impulsive than their nonoffending peers (Chalmers, Olenick, & Stein, 1993; Ryb, 
Dischinger, Kufera, & Read, 2006; Van Dyke & Fillmore, 2014a).  Experiment 1 was 
able to replicate and extend these findings using the UPPS model of impulsivity, which 
decomposes impulsivity into four distinct personality processes.  The largest group 
differences were found in urgency (i.e., tendency to act rashly when experiencing intense 
emotions) and (lack of) premeditation (i.e., tendency to act without considering the 
potential consequences of one’s actions).  Both of these findings can provide insight into 
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situations where DUI offenders may be at high risk to reoffend.  For example, heightened 
urgency suggests that strong negative or positive emotions may prompt impulsive 
decision making, such as deciding to drive after drinking following an interpersonal 
dispute (negative urgency) or in a celebratory context (positive urgency).  Higher levels 
of (lack of) premeditation may suggest that DUI offenders are less responsive 
punishment-based deterrents, as they may not consider potential consequences of their 
actions before deciding to drive.  This may explain why DUI offenders are likely to 
reoffend following criminal-justice oriented interventions (Nochajski & Stasiewicz, 
2006).   
The finding that DUI offenders report heightened levels of urgency builds on a 
growing literature highlighting the importance of urgency in negative substance-use 
outcomes.   This link appears to be present across a range of problematic substance-
related behaviors.  A recent meta-analysis found a reliable association between urgency 
and problematic alcohol use (e.g., physically injuring oneself while drinking, engaging in 
unsafe sexual activities) among adolescents (Stautz & Cooper, 2013).  Similar relations 
between urgency and alcohol use has been shown in adults (Kaiser, Milich, Lynam, & 
Charnigo, 2012).  Such findings suggest that urgency begets problematic substance use 
because users may engage in risk behaviors in order to cope with or avoid situations that 
elicit negative emotions (Verdejo-Garcia, Bechara, Recknor, & Perez-Garcia, 2007).  A 
similar pathway may exist in DUI offenders such that they drive impulsively after 
drinking in order to escape a negative condition.   
Information about the nature of impulsivity in DUI offenders can inform the 
development of targeted intervention strategies.  Knowledge of trait risk factors can be 
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useful for targeting individuals most at risk.  Further, identifying how such traits 
contribute to risk can facilitate developing intervention strategies that more appropriately 
address these areas of concern.  Conrod’s group (Conrod, Castellanos-Ryan, & Strang, 
2010; O'Leary-Barrett, Mackie, Castellanos-Ryan, Al-Khudhairy, & Conrod, 2010) has 
advanced this technique by developing targeted interventions that are appropriate for 
individuals with substance use problems and specific personality traits.  Such 
interventions take into account how these traits might contribute to the problem in 
question and provides the individual with tools to deal with that pattern of behavior. In a 
similar vein, interventions for DUI offenders may be more effective if it includes 
strategies for tolerating emotional distress (urgency) or anticipating the consequences of 
one’s actions ([lack of] premeditation; Zapolski, Settles, Cyders, & Smith, 2010).  
Despite the consistent group differences on self-report measures of impulsivity, 
there were few group differences on the behavioral measures.  The groups performed 
similarly on the money choice task, time estimation task, and letter memory task. On the 
ABBA task, there was no evidence that the DUI group was more disinhibited than control 
participants, and their inhibitory control was no worse when they were made to inhibit to 
alcohol cues.  The lack of group difference on these tasks is surprising given consistent 
evidence for impulsivity in DUI offenders across numerous studies.  A possible 
explanation for this inconsistency is the lack of agreement between behavioral and self-
report measures of impulsivity.  In general, people’s scores on behavioral and 
questionnaire-based measures of impulsivity do not correlate with one another, even 
when they are designed to measure identical constructs (Lane, Cherek, Rhoades, Pietras, 
& Tcheremissine, 2003; Lawrence, Luty, Bogdan, Sahakian, & Clark, 2009).  Other 
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studies have found that behavioral tasks are not successful in differentiating clinical 
groups from their nonclinical peers, even those for whom impulsivity is a core feature of 
their disorder (e.g., individuals with borderline personality disorder; Jacob et al., 2010).   
Simulated Driving Performance  
Driving in the sober state.  Results of the simulated driving tasks provided 
insight into sober-state driving performance in DUI offenders.  In understanding these 
results, it is important to distinguish between risk and skill-based measures of driving 
performance.  Contemporary models of driving distinguish between driving errors 
associated with a lack of knowledge or skill and errors associated with drivers’ 
willingness to tolerate unsafe levels of risk. Although unskilled drivers are more likely to 
be involved in motor vehicle collisions (McKnight & McKnight, 2003), adequately 
skilled individuals can engage in risky driving because they are motivated to do so 
(Ranney, 1994).  Given the heightened impulsivity observed in DUI offenders, it was 
important to assess both skill-based driving as well as driving in situations that may elicit 
impulsive behavior behind the wheel, such as when participants receive reward for 
driving quickly but are punished for driving too quickly.  This increased willingness to 
tolerate risk is thought to explain why impulsive individuals report poorer driving 
histories and outcomes (Owsley, McGwin, & McNeal, 2003).  
Results of experiment 1 were not consistent with prediction.  Despite their higher 
levels of self-reported impulsivity, DUI offenders showed worse sober-state driving 
compared to control participants only in the precision driving scenario.  This scenario 
required participants to navigate a curve-filled country road and contained few other cars 
or roadway hazards.  The challenge of this driving scenario was to maintain road position 
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by making small adjustments to the steering column.  DUI offenders did so with poorer 
precision than controls, as evidenced by more swerving within their lane as well as more 
instances of crossing the center or outside line of the road.  DUI offenders also showed 
more variability in speed than did controls.  These findings suggest impairment among 
DUI offenders in driving scenarios that require skills such as sustained attention and 
motor control.  Although this was not consistent with my original predictions, prior work 
has shown that DUI offenders evidence deficits in cognitive functions such as sustained 
attention (Glass, Chan, & Rentz, 2000), which may explain their impairment in precision 
driving.  In contrast, the lack of significant group differences in the motivational conflict 
drive does not support the notion that DUI offenders are more likely take risks while 
driving when doing so may yield reward.  Taken together, these findings indicate that 
DUI offenders are more likely to show a lack of skill rather than a tendency towards 
taking risks behind the wheel, which may explain their poorer driving records.   
Driving under alcohol.  Alcohol impaired performance in both the motivational 
conflict and precision driving scenarios.  Prior research shows that alcohol can impair 
skills implicated in skill-based driving (e.g., motor control, reaction time, sustained 
attention; Koelega, 1995; Mitchell, 1985).  Intoxicated drivers also show a willingness to 
tolerate greater risks than when driving sober (Burian, Liguori, & Robinson, 2002).  
Results of this study confirmed alcohol impairment on both of these factors in both DUI 
offenders and controls.  On the precision drive, alcohol caused greater variability in lane 
position, a shift that likely contributes to higher rates of vehicle collisions following 
alcohol consumption.  On the motivational conflict drive, alcohol led to shorter braking 
distance, faster average speed, and greater variability in lane position.  Taken together, 
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these alcohol-induced changes in driving support the notion that alcohol may cause 
drivers to become more erratic and willing to tolerate greater risk, especially in the 
presence of opportunity for reward.    
Experiment 2 was the first to use an expectancy manipulation to attempt to reduce 
the effect of alcohol on driving performance.  This manipulation was based on a large 
collection of prior work showing that the behavioral effects of alcohol can be minimized 
by providing drinkers with feedback that alcohol will impair their performance on a 
skilled task (Fillmore & Vogel-Sprott, 1996; Beirness & Vogel-Sprott, 1984; Fillmore & 
Blackburn, 2002).  Interestingly, using a very similar method of expectancy 
manipulation, I was not able to improve driving performance under alcohol in either the 
motivational conflict or precision driving scenario.  Indeed, performance following 0.64 
g/kg alcohol was strikingly similar to performance following 0.64 g/kg alcohol + 
expectancy manipulation.  Theoretical accounts of functionional tolerance state that 
drinkers are able to offset impairment by using behavioral strategies (e.g., allocating 
additional effort) in order to compensate for the effects of alcohol (Vogel-Sprott, 1992). 
Findings on functional tolerance are noteworthy because such feedback consistently 
improves performance on many different types of tasks.  The finding that driving 
performance under alcohol is not improved by expectancy manipulation is unique and 
suggests that alcohol effects on driving may be particularly difficult to compensate for 
and overcome, perhaps because driving is a relatively complex task with many cognitive 
demands (Maylor, Rabbitt, James, & Kerr, 1992).        
The finding that DUI offenders did not differ from control participants in terms of 
alcohol effects on simulated driving performance indicates that they do not show 
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increased impairment of driving ability under the drug.  This was somewhat surprising 
given that the current sample of DUI offenders showed several characteristics previously 
associated with increased behavioral impairment under alcohol, such as poor driving 
ability when sober (Harrison & Fillmore, 2005) and impulsivity (Fillmore, Ostling, 
Martin, & Kelly, 2009).  Nonetheless, it replicates prior research also finding that DUI 
offenders do not show more driving impairment under alcohol than nonoffenders (Van 
Dyke & Fillmore, 2014b). One possibility is that a group of more impaired DUI 
offenders, such as repeat offenders (Ouimet et al., 2007), may show this increased 
impairment under alcohol.  Taken together with the findings of Van Dyke and Fillmore 
(2014b), the findings of experiment 2 provide strong evidence that DUI offenders are not 
characteristically more impaired by alcohol than their nonoffending peers.    
Decision-Making Processes 
If DUI offenders are not more impaired by alcohol, then they must be choosing to 
drive in situations that their nonoffending peers would not.  Decision-making processes 
were explored in both experiments using the newly developed RRDD task.  This task was 
used to explore how situational variables might influence decision making in DUI 
offenders by modeling a situation in which they must decide between obtaining a reward 
by taking risks.  Results of this task were generally supportive of its validity.  As 
expected, participants required more money to drive as level of risk increased, and this 
increase occurred in a linear fashion.  The increase in money required to drive as a 
function of risk occurred in each factor, supporting the notion that participants consider 
time since drinking, probability of arrest, distance to be travelled, and BAC to be relevant 
factors when deciding whether to drive after drinking (Thurman, 1986).  The finding that 
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DUI offenders were willing to drive for less money overall for some factors (i.e., time 
since drinking) supports the validity of the task, as does the finding that DUI offenders 
showed less of an increase in money required to drive as time since drinking decreased.  
This suggests that this group may be less likely to consider the variable when deciding 
whether to drive after drinking.    
After collecting evidence for the validity of the RRDD task, the next step was to 
use it to understand how decision-making related to alcohol-impaired driving when an 
individual has consumed alcohol.   In experiment 2, responses on this task were 
summarized as average money required to drive and risk slope.  Average money required 
to drive provided an overall estimate of willingness to drive across different levels of 
risk.  Risk slope provided an estimate of how much changes in risk affected motivation to 
drive. Less steep risk slopes suggest relative insensitivity to changes in risk.  There was 
little effect of alcohol on responses on the RRDD task: average money required to drive 
and slope were generally stable between doses.  This finding is surprising given ample 
evidence that alcohol can impair decision making across a number of contexts, including 
gambling (George, Rogers, & Duka, 2005) and sexual activity (Abbey, Saenz, Buck, 
Parkhill, & Hayman, 2006).  One possibility is that alcohol did not alter responses on the 
RRDD task because they were hypothetical.  Indeed, one study showed that alcohol did 
not affect impulsive responding (i.e., delay discounting) on a hypothetical money choice 
task (Reynolds, Richards, & de Wit, 2006).  In this same study, however, alcohol caused 
an increase in impulsive responding when performing an experiential discounting task in 
which they received the reinforcer immediately after responding, effectively removing 
the hypothetical nature of the task.  Changing the RRDD task to make it less hypothetical 
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may improve its ability to detect acute alcohol effects.  Another possibility is that higher 
doses of alcohol than that used in experiment 2 (0.64 g/kg) are necessary to produce 
reliable changes in decision-making processes.   
Responses on the RRDD task were not affected by expectancy manipulation.  
This is also surprising given that providing a drinker with information that his or her 
ability to drive is extremely impaired by alcohol should increase the level of risk 
associated with the decision to drive after drinking.  Level of risk is a central factor in 
decision making (Weber & Johnson, 2009), and a decider is less likely to make a choice 
when that choice is associated with higher levels of risk.  Indeed, results of the RRDD 
task in both experiments showed that participants needed more incentive to drive when 
the level of risk increased, confirming that levels of risk played a role in decision-making 
processes in this sample.  One possible explanation for this lack of effect is that 
participants did not perceive level of driving impairment under alcohol to be a pertinent 
factor in evaluating the level of risk associated with deciding to drive after drinking.  
Other outcomes, such as being arrested, may be a more salient undesirable outcome for 
these drivers when they are deciding whether to drive after drinking.  Future research 
should use a more comprehensive feedback strategy that incorporates more emotionally 
salient outcomes to manipulate drivers’ expectancies (e.g., increasing likelihood of arrest, 
increased punishment following arrest, increased likelihood of injuring another motorist), 
because emotionally salient information can influence decision making (Loewenstein, 
Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001).  
Another interpretation is that the expectancy manipulation simply was not 
effective, although this was not supported by participants’ ratings of their ability to drive.  
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Indeed, participants in the DUI group rated themselves as more able to drive than did 
controls following 0.64 g/kg alcohol, despite their performance on the driving simulator 
being similar to that of control participants.  This finding is consistent with previous work 
showing that DUI offenders underestimate their level of driving impairment under 
alcohol (Van Dyke & Fillmore, 2014b).  Experiment 2 extended this prior research by 
identifying a strategy for reducing perceived ability to drive while intoxicated in the DUI 
offenders.  Following expectancy manipulation, DUI offenders rated their ability to drive 
at a level that was similar to control participants.  This finding is important because the 
decision to drive after drinking is based in part on perceived level of intoxication and 
impairment (Quinn & Fromme, 2012).  As such, altering expectations about alcohol 
impairment may be a viable strategy for reducing risk of impaired driving among DUI 
offenders.  Such interventions could be modelled after existing feedback-based 
interventions that seek to change drinking behavior by challenging expectations about 
normative drinking (Walters & Neighbors, 2005).  Such techniques provide more 
comprehensive (i.e., several sessions) expectancy challenges and are quite effective at 
reducing problematic alcohol-related behaviors.    
This finding is consistent with the notion that DUI offenders, by virtue of their 
impulsivity, are not able to perceive accurately the degree to which alcohol impairs their 
driving performance.  One characteristic of impulsive individuals is limited insight into 
their own performance (de Bruijn et al., 2006), leading to overestimation of their 
competence at certain tasks.  In the context of alcohol intoxication, high-risk impulsive 
individuals (e.g., binge drinkers, those with ADHD) appear to overestimate their abilities 
when intoxicated (Marczinski, Harrison, & Fillmore, 2008; Weafer, Camarillo, Fillmore, 
 
84 
 
Milich, & Marczinski, 2008).  Participants’ ratings of perceived ability to drive supported 
the notion that DUI offenders underestimate their level of impairment, a deficit that can 
be corrected using external sources of information to develop a more realistic evaluation 
of their abilities.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 The research in this dissertation provides into impulsivity, decision-making, and 
acute responses to alcohol and expectancy manipulation among DUI offenders; however, 
there are some interpretive limitations to these findings.  I was not able to recruit a group 
of recidivist DUI offenders. Repeat offenders may be more likely to show higher levels 
of impulsivity and more pronounced differences in decision making compared to their 
nonoffending peers (Ouimet et al., 2007).  Considering previous work showing 
differences between recidivist and one-time DUI offenders, future research should 
include both of these groups in order to identify differences between them.  Another 
limitation is that experiment 2 only examined driving performance and decision-making 
under a single active dose of alcohol (i.e., 0.64 g/kg).  This dose was chosen for its 
ecological relevance to DUI: it is the legal limit for driving in the United States.  
However, it is possible that DUI offenders will show more impairment than controls 
below the legal limit of intoxication.  Future research should include an additional lower 
dose of alcohol to test this possibility.   
 Another limitation to the current research involves the RRDD task.  Because this 
task was developed for this pair of experiments, there is little evidence for its validity 
beyond data reported in this dissertation.  Several findings supported the validity of the 
task, but there are still many open questions about how to interpret the results of the task.  
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Additional studies will be necessary to refine this task.   Manipulations of parametric 
characteristics (e.g., changing the levels of risk and reward) and testing different methods 
of data reduction and interpretation may increase the validity of the task.  An advantage 
of this task is its flexibility.  Simple changes to the scenarios could be made to include 
additional risk factors, such as driving after mixing alcohol and other drugs.  Such 
alterations could be useful in understanding how people decide to drive after drinking in 
many different circumstances of substance use.   
 The finding that expectancy manipulation decreased perceived driving ability in 
DUI offenders could guide the development of interventions for this group.  However, it 
is unclear whether this finding will generalize to behavior outside of the laboratory 
setting.  Additional research will be necessary to determine whether this style of 
expectancy manipulation causes enduring changes in perceived ability to drive while 
intoxicated and test whether these reductions result in decreased rates of driving while 
intoxicated.  One method for establishing the validity of this task will be examining its 
relation to DUI variables at the level of individual difference.  The current study was not 
sufficiently powered to conduct these analyses, so future research should include larger 
sample to determine whether responses on this task relate to drinking and driving 
behavior.  
 In sum, results of these two experiments provide new information about 
impulsivity and acute responses on alcohol in DUI offenders.  These individuals are 
indeed more impulsive than their nonoffending peers, and this impulsivity appears to 
manifest as riskier decision making in the context of choosing whether to drive after 
drinking.  Although DUI offenders do not appear to become more impaired under 
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 Results of this study cannot be attributed to group differences in demographic 
variables or drinking history, because the groups were matched on these variables (see 
Experiment 1).  The carefully controlled weight-adjusted dosing procedure ensured that 
BACs that were similar between groups and sessions.  Expired air samples confirmed that 
participants achieved similar BACs before and after completing the tasks during each 
session in which alcohol was administered.   
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